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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. 2 Capital structure decisions in family firms -empirical evidence from a bankbased economy Terms of use: Documents in Abstract:This study examines how family firm characteristics affect capital structure decisions. In our analysis we disentangle the influence of three distinct components of a family firm: ownership, supervisory and management board activities by the founding family. Thereby, we use a unique panel dataset of 660 publicly listed companies (5,135 firm years) in the broadest German stock index CDAX from 1995 to 2006. This paper is motivated by hitherto inconclusive empirical findings on capital structure decisions in family firms from AngloSaxon countries. We provide new evidence for a bank-based economy. In this sense, Germany provides a very fruitful research environment as it (i) traditionally has a bank-based financial system and (ii) family firms are considered to be the backbone of the economy.We find that family firms have significantly lower leverage ratios than non-family firms, independent of the definition of leverage applied. Among the three dimensions of a family firm, management board involvement by the founding family has a consistently negative influence on leverage across all our models. In contrast, the influence of ownership and supervisory board representation is insignificant in almost all of our models. In line with agency theory, we can show that the leverage level is the lowest if the founding family is simultaneously a large shareholder with monitoring incentives and involved in firm management with convergence-of-interest effects. Finally, we detect that the presence of a founder CEO in firm management has a significant negative effect on the leverage ratio. Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests including a matching estimator technique to demonstrate causal effects. JEL Classification: G 32, G 34

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. 2 Capital structure decisions in family firms -empirical evidence from a bankbased economy Terms of use: Documents in Abstract:This study examines how family firm characteristics affect capital structure decisions. In our analysis we disentangle the influence of three distinct components of a family firm: ownership, supervisory and management board activities by the founding family. Thereby, we use a unique panel dataset of 660 publicly listed companies (5,135 firm years) in the broadest German stock index CDAX from 1995 to 2006. This paper is motivated by hitherto inconclusive empirical findings on capital structure decisions in family firms from AngloSaxon countries. We provide new evidence for a bank-based economy. In this sense, Germany provides a very fruitful research environment as it (i) traditionally has a bank-based financial system and (ii) family firms are considered to be the backbone of the economy.We find that family firms have significantly lower leverage ratios than non-family firms, independent of the definition of leverage applied. Among the three dimensions of a family firm, management board involvement by the founding family has a consistently negative influence on leverage across all our models. In contrast, the influence of ownership and supervisory board representation is insignificant in almost all of our models. In line with agency theory, we can show that the leverage level is the lowest if the founding family is simultaneously a large shareholder with monitoring incentives and involved in firm management with convergence-of-interest effects. Finally, we detect that the presence of a founder CEO in firm management has a significant negative effect on the leverage ratio. Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests including a matching estimator technique to demonstrate causal effects. JEL Classification: G 32, G 34

Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper empirically tests how founders and their families affect business segment diversification. We contribute to the literature by studying the distinct effects of family ownership, management, and supervision on diversification strategies. Research Findings/Insights: We use a large panel dataset of listed German firms. Our results indicate a sharp contrast between firms owned by families and those in which the family holds an active management position. Firms owned by families have higher levels of diversification. However, the opposite is true for firms managed by families. Furthermore, other large shareholders perform a monitoring role and induce family owners to concentrate on their core business. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper clearly confirms that family firms comprise a heterogeneous group of firms. Thus, empirical research in this area should carefully distinguish the impact of different channels (i.e., management vs. ownership) families may use to influence corporate decision making. For diversification decisions, we can even show that family ownership and management have an opposite impact. Founding families have to trade off the desire to preserve financial wealth (via diversification) with the risk of losing control and endangering their socioemotional wealth (SEW). Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policy makers, our results underline that family firms are not a homogeneous group of firms. Hence, it is important to consider their heterogeneity in the political discussion. For example, needs and preferences of family managed firms may differ substantially from those of family owned firms. Equity investors and debt providers should also be aware of this family firm heterogeneity.

Using a unique proprietary data set of 1980 realized and unrealized buyouts completed between 1986 and 2010, we examine entry and exit pricing in buyouts and its influence on private equity (PE) sponsors' returns. We find that besides leverage and operational improvements, EBITDA multiple expansion (i.e. the difference between entry and exit pricing) is a fundamental factor in explaining equity returns and the result of skill rather than pure luck. We also provide evidence that more experienced PE sponsors use more debt to finance a PE transaction and debt is positively related to entry buyout pricing. However, for a transaction with a given leverage level, more experienced PE sponsors are able to negotiate lower prices. In addition, our results show that deals conducted by first time funds which are realized in a later stage of a fund's life cycle are associated with lower exit prices which can be explained by the increased exit pressure for the PE sponsor.

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