In this paper, we put forward a new account of emergence called "transformational emergence". Such an account captures a variety of emergence that can be considered as being diachronic and weakly ontological. The fact that transformational emergence actually constitutes a genuine form of emergence is motivated. Besides, the account is free of traditional problems surrounding more usual, synchronic versions of emergence, and it can find a strong empirical support in a specific physical phenomenon, the fractional quantum Hall effect, which has long been touted as a paradigmatic case of emergence.

A computer program was developed to allow easy derivation of steady-state velocity and binding equations for multireactant mechanisms including or without rapid equilibrium segments. Its usefulness is illustrated by deriving the rate equation of the most general sequential iso ordered ter ter mechanism of cotransport in which two Na+ ions bind first to the carrier and mirror symmetry is assumed. It is demonstrated that this mechanism cannot be easily reduced to a previously proposed six-state model of Na+-D-glucose cotransport, which also includes a number of implicit assumptions. In fact, the latter model may only be valid over a restricted range of Na+ concentrations or when assuming very strong positive cooperativity for Na+ binding to the glucose symporter within a rapid equilibrium segment. We thus propose an equivalent eight-state model in which the concept of positive cooperativity is best explained within the framework of a polymeric structure of the transport protein involving a minimum number of two transport-competent and identical subunits. This model also includes an obligatory slow isomerization step between the Na+ and glucose-binding sequences, the nature of which might reflect the presence of functionally asymmetrical subunits.

The elucidation of the gauge principle "is the most pressing problem in current philosophy of physics" Michael Redhead in 2003. This paper argues for two points that contribute to this elucidation in the context of Yang-Mills theories. 1) Yang-Mills theories, including quantum electrodynamics, form a class. They should be interpreted together. To focus on electrodynamics is potentially misleading. 2) The essential role of gauge and BRST symmetries is to provide a local field theory that can be quantized and would be equivalent to the quantization of the non-local reduced theory. If this is correct, the gauge symmetry is significant, not so much because it implies ontological consequences, but because it allows us to quantize theories that we would not be able to quantize otherwise. Thus, in the context of Yang-Mills theories, it is essentially a pragmatic principle. This does not seem to be the case for the gauge symmetry in general relativity.

Several advocates of the lively field of "metaphysics of science" have recently argued that a naturalistic metaphysics should be based solely on current science, and that it should replace more traditional, intuition-based, forms of metaphysics. The aim of the present paper is to assess that claim by examining the relations between metaphysics of science and general metaphysics. We show that the current metaphysical battlefield is richer and more complex than a simple dichotomy between "metaphysics of science" and "traditional metaphysics", and that it should instead be understood as a three dimensional "box", with one axis distinguishing "descriptive metaphysics" from "revisionary metaphysics," a second axis distinguishing a priori from a posteriori metaphysics, and a third axis distinguishing "commonsense metaphysics", "traditional metaphysics" and "metaphysics of science." We use this three-dimensional figure to shed light on the project of current metaphysics of science, and to demonstrate that, in many instances, the target of that project is not defined with enough precision and clarity.

This paper explores the relation between the concept of symmetry and its formalisms. The standard view among philosophers and physicists is that symmetry is completely formalized by mathematical groups. For some mathematicians however, the groupoid is a competing and more general formalism. An analysis of symmetry which justifies this extension has not been adequately spelled out. After a brief explication of how groups, equivalence, * Previous versions of this paper were presented at the University of Pittsburgh and at theÉcole Normale Supérieure (Paris). Thanks to the members of those audiences for their comments and questions and especially to John Earman and Gordon Belot. Guay's work was supported by a postdoctoral grant form the Fonds de Recherche sur la Société et la Culture du Québec (Canada). 1 and symmetries classes are related, we show that, while it's true in some instances that groups are too restrictive, there are other instances for which the standard extension to groupoids is too unrestrictive. The connection between groups and equivalence classes, when generalized to groupoids, suggests a middle ground between the two.