Zero Accident Vision based strategies in organisations: Innovative perspectives

Vision zero: from accident prevention to the promotion of health, safety and well-being at work

“…According to the critics, the focus in ZAV is on attaining zero injury rates, which may lead to underreporting (Sharman, 2014), and trickery and fraud with numbers Dekker and Pitzer, 2015;Dekker, 2014b). For a more in-depth overview, see Zwetsloot et al (2017a).…”

“…According to Zwetsloot et al (2017a), part of the criticism seems to be based on the assumption that ZAV committed companies are trying harder to do the same old safety things, i.e. to make more safety procedures (systems associated with greater bureaucracy), and to be stricter and more punitive towards unsafe behaviour.…”

“…Young., 2014;Zwetsloot et al, 2017a), thereby being keen to make use of technical and social innovations (Young, 2014). Companies and their personnel see ZAV as a journey driven by genuine long-term commitment (Young, 2014;Twaalfhoven and Kortleven, 2016;Koivupalo, 2015;Zwetsloot et al, 2017a) that does not lead to more bureaucracy.…”

“…Young., 2014;Zwetsloot et al, 2017a), thereby being keen to make use of technical and social innovations (Young, 2014). Companies and their personnel see ZAV as a journey driven by genuine long-term commitment (Young, 2014;Twaalfhoven and Kortleven, 2016;Koivupalo, 2015;Zwetsloot et al, 2017a) that does not lead to more bureaucracy. Instead, it leads to higher worker commitment and more empowerment (Zwetsloot et al, 2017b), to managers giving safety very high priority in daily practice, to the encouragement of participation and learning, and a culture that has more characteristics of a 'just culture' than is found in non-ZAV frontrunner firms (Zwetsloot et al, 2017b).…”

Recurring themes in the legacy of Jens Rasmussen

“…Stafford Beer's work on the Viable Systems Model - Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2012;Waterson, Baber and Li., 2016;Rid, 2016). Likewise, Rasmussen's argument that human error is an inevitable outcome of complex work environments takes on an added dimension of relevancy in the light of recent drives towards the goal of 'zero accidents' and 'zero fatalities' within occupational safety (Zwetsloot et al, 2013;Zwetsloot et al, 2017), as well as other debates surrounding 'just culture' and the allocation of responsibility and attributions of blame within accidents (Holden, 2009;Dekker, Newell, 1980) and meant at the time that new risk models with a wider range of inputs from cross-disciplinary research (sociology, policy science, organisational behaviour) and levels of analysis (e.g. multi-level analysis - Hale et al, 1996) were needed.…”