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Récanati, François

doi:10.1023/a:1010383405105

Cited by 157 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Another way to make these points is to say that the openness of interpretation that clearly exists in the case of art is not a departure from everyday interpretation more generally, it is simply (much) more open ended. Ordinary linguistic utterances underdetermine their meaning, often vastly so (Grice 1989 p.31;Recanati 2001;Sperber and Wilson 1995 pp.181-182;Carston 2008). They are, quite typically, multiply ambiguous, and often contain expressions that do not specify their referent at all (e.g.…”

Section: Interpretation In the Roundmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Art Experience

2019

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Art theory has consistently emphasised the importance of situational, cultural, institutional and historical factors in viewers' experience of fine art. However, the link between this heavily context-dependent interpretation and the workings of the mind is often left unexamined. Drawing on relevance theory-a prominent, cogent and productive body of work in cognitive pragmatics-we here argue that fine art achieves its effects by prompting the use of cognitive processes that are more commonly employed in the interpretation of words and other stimuli presented in a communicative context. We describe in particular how institutional factors effectively co-opt these processes for new ends, allowing viewers to achieve cognitive effects that they otherwise would not, and so provide cognitivist backing for an Institutional Theory of Art, such as that put forward by Arthur Danto (1964). More generally, we situate and describe the Western fine art tradition as a phenomenon that is a consequence of both the cognitive processes involved in communication, and of cultural norms, practices and institutions.

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Section: Interpretation In the Roundmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Art Experience

2019

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“…What is said, in this sense, does not include implicature, nor some examples of nonliteral speech such as irony. What is said, in this sense, tracks a psychologically real category of intuitive truth conditions; see also Recanati (2001); Recanati (2002); Recanati (2004). Theorists disagree about what counts as what is said as opposed to what is implicated (or conveyed in some similar nonliteral way).…”

Section: Linguistic Meaningmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…This raises complex questions about whether speakers and hearers must explicitly entertain the propositions in question. For my purposes, I need only the idea that these propositions capture the intuitive truth conditions of the utterance that are in principle available to competent speakers even if they are not explicitly entertained; see Recanati (2001); Recanati (2004).…”

Section: Linguistic Meaningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Untitled

2018

Dialectica

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Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is said. This has consequences for philosophical accounts of meaning, communication, and propositional attitude reports. I argue that the consequence we should endorse is that utterances typically express many propositions, that these are what speakers mean, and that the correct semantics for attitude reports will handle this fact while being relational and propositional.

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“…Another way to make these points is to say that the openness of interpretation that clearly exists in the case of art is not a departure from everyday interpretation more generally, it is simply (much) more openended. Ordinary linguistic utterances underdetermine their meaning, often vastly so (Grice, 1989 p.31;Recanati, 2001;Sperber & Wilson, 1995 pp.181-182;Carston, 2008). They are, quite typically, multiply ambiguous, and often contain expressions that do not specify their referent at all (e.g.…”

Section: Interpretation In the Roundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognition, emphasis, and the viewer’s experience of fine art

McCallum¹,

Mitchell²,

Scott‐Phillips³

2018

Preprint

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Art theory has consistently emphasised the importance of situational, cultural, institutional and historical factors in viewers’ experience of fine art. However, the link between this heavily context-dependent interpretation and the workings of the mind is often left unexamined. Drawing on recent developments in cognitive pragmatics, we here argue that fine art achieves its effects by prompting the use of cognitive processes that are more commonly employed in the interpretation of words and other stimuli presented in a communicative context, drawing an analogy between gallery framing and communicative emphasis. More generally, we situate and describe the Western fine art tradition as a phenomenon that is a consequence of both human biological heritage and of cultural norms, practices and institutions.

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Cited by 157 publications

References 0 publications

The Art Experience

The Art Experience

Untitled

Cognition, emphasis, and the viewer’s experience of fine art

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