2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103344
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WTO tariff commitments and temporary protection: Complements or substitutes?

Abstract: There is a long-held notion in the trade policy literature that traditional tariff instruments and temporary protection (TP) measures are substitutes. Despite this prediction, there is only mixed empirical evidence for a link between tariff reductions and the usage pattern of antidumping, safeguard and countervailing duties. Based on recent theoretical advances, I argue in this paper that the relevant trade policy margin for implementing TP measures is instead tariff overhangs, the difference between WTO bound… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(18 citation statements)
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References 49 publications
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“…The study further argued that government has control over domestic production of foreign firms particularly for homogenous products. Kuenzel (2020) found a significant inverse relationship between tariff overhangs and trade policy activity. Different share of tariff lines result in alternate outcome; like lower tariff overhangs compel countries to increase Most-Favored Nation (MFN) applied rates without consideration of past tariff independent changes and legal ramifications.…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…The study further argued that government has control over domestic production of foreign firms particularly for homogenous products. Kuenzel (2020) found a significant inverse relationship between tariff overhangs and trade policy activity. Different share of tariff lines result in alternate outcome; like lower tariff overhangs compel countries to increase Most-Favored Nation (MFN) applied rates without consideration of past tariff independent changes and legal ramifications.…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Negative tariff water represents a rare event in our dataset. Still, readers should keep in mind that developing countries had several years to adjust their applied tariffs to the tariff bindings negotiated during the Uruguay round (Beshkar et al, 2015;Kuenzel, 2020). 14 It is well known that the price elasticity of substitution equals the price elasticity of demand in models based on CES utility functions when the number of varieties is large.…”
Section: Changes In the Measures Of Tariff Water And Market Powermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If other traderelated policies were adopted around the same time as the changes implemented under the ITA, then our estimates of the latter could be biased. A case in point are non-tariff measures (NTMs), whose adoption may increase after tariff reductions (Kuenzel, 2018). 47 To generate serious concern for our ITA commitment effect estimates, NTMs would need to be targeted at ITA goods exclusively while omitting similar ICT goods.…”
Section: Concerns: Omitted Variables and Endogeneitymentioning
confidence: 99%