Wildlife management, illegal hunting and conflicts. A bioeconomic analysis

Abstract

The paper analyzes the conflict between illegal and legal exploitation of wildlife species in an East African context. In the model there are two agents, an agency managing a national park of fixed area and a group of local people living in the vicinity of the park. The park agency has the legal right to exploit the wildlife, while the local people hunt illegally. Because of the property rights, the park agency has incentives to invest in the stock of wildlife, while the behaviour of the local people is steered by short-term considerations. The model is analyzed in two steps. Firstly, the market solution is studied. Next, the model is examined when user and property rights are given to the local people.

Optimal spatial management of renewable resources: matching policy scope to ecosystem scale

“…9 See Clark [5,6] for a two-patch model of optimal spatial exploitation where harvests can be instantaneously adjusted in the case of relative density-dependent dispersal systems. Using the Clark [6] formulation, Tuck and Possingham [24] investigate optimal management in a two-patch, sink-source system with no economic heterogeneity, and Huffaker et al [10] and Skonhoft and Solstad [21] investigate optimal management in a two-patch setting for terrestrial species. Janmatt [11] finds qualitatively similar results to ours when studying the optimal spatial management for a northeast Atlantic clam fishery.…”

A Bio-Economic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Under CAMPFIRE

“…It also creates considerable tension over wildlife in the national parks that border the less productive farm areas. 3 See also Shulz and Skonhoft (1996), Skonhoft and Solstad (1996), and Skonhoft and Solstad (1998), on the welfare of the communities. Communities are passive in this model, receiving the revenues of the property shares and the burdens of the wildlife interactions, which take the form of intrusions.…”

Modelling the effect of individual strategic behaviour on community-level outcomes of conservation interventions

“…Previous studies examining the enforcement of resourceuse rules have tended to concentrate on the users' incentives (for example fishers or poachers; Leader-Williams & MilnerGulland 1993;Skonhoft & Solstad 1996;Damania et al 2005). However, the success of enforcement also depends crucially on monitors' incentives to carry out their duties (Mookherjee & Png 1995;Mesterton-Gibbons & Milner-Gulland 1998;Robinson et al 2010).…”