Wielding the Stick Instead of the Carrot: Labor PAC Punishment of Pro-NAFTA Democrats

Abstract

Political action committees normally use contributions as a reward or inducement for access or favorable roll-call votes. In extreme cases, however, PACs may reduce funding as part of a punishment strategy. The rollcall vote on the North American Free Trade Agreement in the House of Representatives provides an interesting test case for the strategy of punishment. Organized labor was clearly against NAFTA and threatened to reduce support to proponents of the agreement. If a punishment strategy is followed by interest groups, we would expect to find it in this case. Ordinary least squares regression is used to examine labor PAC contribution strategy. We find that labor followed a short-term punishment strategy against Democratic supporters of NAFTA.Research on the campaign contribution strategies of political action committees (PACs) reveals that contributions serve as an inducement or a reward to candidates. PACs hold out a carrot to candidates in order to encourage certain behavior. These studies have ignored the possibility of PACs using contributions as a stick. If the spending of money serves as a reward or an inducement, then the reduction of money could serve as a punishment. This study examines whether PACs reduce funding for traditional allies in order to punish them in extreme cases.

Interest Group Lobbying on a Morality Policy Issue: The Case of Physician-Assisted Suicide in Michigan

“…In contrast, when labor and business groups lobby on controversial economic issues, legislators' basic values are not involved, and they are subject to cross-pressures with constituents, interest groups, party, and the executive jockeying for influence. There is a chance that legislators will "betray" interest groups that have supported them, and the response of interest groups may be to withhold or reduce contributions (Engel and Jackson 1998).…”

Testing Spatial Models of Elections: The Influence of Voters and Elites on Candidate Issue Positions

“…Interest groups also represent an important source of funding and other resources for political campaigns, and many candidates are unwilling to risk losing the potential contributions that interest groups can provide (Baron 1989). The connection between candidates' positions and interest group support is complex and probably reciprocal (Endersby and Munger 1992;Engel and Jackson 1998;Grenzke 1989;Hall and Wayman 1990;Langbein 1993), but it is likely that the issue preferences of potential interest group allies are of some importance to candidates. When the preferences of these potential supporters, such as labor unions, are not the same as the mass electorate's preferences, candidates may be forced away from the median in order to secure campaign money and other resources (Baron 1994).…”

Don’t Bite The Pac That Feeds You

“…In the few high-salience cases, however, the relationship between legislator and interest group may become strained and lead the interest group to seek to punish the legislator. Previous research suggests that PACs may punish members of Congress in extreme cases of betrayal of the PACs'interests and also that generally the punishment will occur only in the election immediately following the defection (Engel & Jackson, 1998).…”