Why our best theories of perception and physics undermine realism

Abstract

Realism about objects proposes an isomorphism between the objects of the external world and the corresponding mental representations. A candle on a table leads to the percept of this candle. Ontologically, realism locates objects between the entities of fundamental physics and the perceiver. Here, we show that under the assumption of a mind independent world of physical particles there is no space for a mind independent world of objects. The mental representations partition the physical world into classes of states, each class corresponding to one mental representation. Since there are many more physical states than representations, the mapping is not unique. Hence, different perceivers may maintain different partitions of the physical world, leading to different mind dependent representations and objects. In general, we show that if there is one fundamental ontology (fundamental physics), one cannot have any other ontology (objects) in addition. Furthermore, we show that realism is not even a desirable goal of perception. These considerations by no means favor dualism or solipsism. These ontological considerations are presented in part II. Based on neuroscience results, we show in part I that realism is not an epistemologically tenable position either.

George Orwell, objectivity, and the reality behind illusions

“…In addition, like Herzog & Doerig (2021) and others, Hoffman denies physical objecthood. However, given that there is a reality out there, it cannot be a point singularity, nor can it be perfectly homogeneous, isotropic, or symmetrical along all its dimensions or parameters, whatever they may be (not space and time, according to Hoffman).…”

“… 4. For example, ‘Here, we show that under the assumption of a mind independent world of physical particles there is no space for a mind in dependent world of objects. … If there is one fundamental ontology (fundamental physics), one cannot have any other ontology (objects) in addition.’ (Herzog & Doerig, 2021, p. 1). A second example is in Hoffman’s book The Case Against Reality (2019, p. xii) where he states: ’our perceptions of snakes and apples, and even of space and time, do not reveal objective reality.’ Taken together with the title, this clearly suggests there are no such objects, no such reality.…”