Why Kant Could not Have Been a Utilitarian

Abstract

In 1993, Richard Hare argued that, contrary to received opinion, Kant could have been a utilitarian. In this article, I argue that Hare was wrong. Kant's theory would not have been utilitarian or consequentialist even if his practical recommendations coincided with utilitarian commands: Kant's theory of value is essentially anti-utilitarian; there is no place for rational contradiction as the source of moral imperatives in utilitarianism; Kant would reject the move to separate levels of moral thinking: first-order moral judgement makes use of the principle of morality; and, relatedly, he would resist the common utilitarian distinction between actions and their motives because any correct description of an action must refer to motivation. The article concludes with the thought that any consequentialist theory based on pre-given ends (teleology) lacks the philosophical resources to distinguish between willing something as a means and as an end, leaving means only, and destroying transparency.

Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged

“…Timmermann begins by misstating Hare's motivation for the gap‐bridging as the fact that “both theories appear to favour general happiness.” This would indeed be a damningly slender basis. In support of this claim, Timmermann quotes Hare as saying that both Kant and utilitarians can “prescribe that we should do what will conduce to satisfying people's rational preferences or wills‐for‐ends—ends of which happiness is the sum” (, 245; quoting Hare , 151). But when we look at the context of this point, we see that Hare was describing here only one reason he was “tempted to say” that Kantian ethics had a certain utilitarian element, not the only reason.…”

“…Throughout his article Timmermann shows a systematic ignorance of the arguments Hare uses to support his own version of utilitarianism. He pervasively assumes that utilitarianism, including Hare's version of it, starts from what Timmermann calls “pre‐given ends” (, 244), while Kantianism does not and cannot do so, forcing a fundamental divide between the two theories. Utilitarianism need not use such assumptions, however.…”

“…In response, several authors have attempted to show that such arguments are mistaken, and that Kantian and consequentialist ethics cannot be reconciled (Dean ; Nordenstam ; Terada ; Timmermann ; Weinstock ). These criticisms are flawed and reveal misunderstandings of Kantian and consequentialist ethics, in particular by failing to distinguish the normative and metaethical aspects of each.…”

Rejoinder to Wall

“…In “Timmermann, Forschler, and the Attempt to Bridge the Kantian‐Consequentialist Gap” Edmund Wall () disagrees with my argument in “Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged” (Forschlder ), contra Jens Timmermann in “Why Kant Could Not Have Been a Utilitarian” (), that R. M. Hare's ethical theory could bridge the gap between Kantian and consequentialist moral theories. Wall objects specifically to my claim that Hare's consequentialism is normative and as such does not necessarily conflict with any of Kant's metaethical claims.…”

Timmermann, Forschler, and The Attempt to Bridge the Kantian‐Consequentialist Gap

“…In his paper “Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged” (2013), Scott Forschler defends R. M. Hare's rationalist‐universalizing‐utilitarian moral approach against Jens Timmermann's critique of it (Timmermann ). Forschler argues that Timmermann fails to see that Kant's ethical rationalism might be consistent with utilitarianism, and that Timmermann merely assumes that Kant's deontology follows logically from his ethical rationalism.…”