2010
DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x10000026
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Why a theory of human nature cannot be based on the distinction between universality and variability: Lessons from anthropology

Abstract: We welcome the critical appraisal of the database used by the behavioral sciences, but we suggest that the authors' differentiation between variable and universal features is ill conceived and that their categorization of non-WEIRD populations is misleading. We propose a different approach to comparative research, which takes population variability seriously and recognizes the methodological difficulties it engenders.

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Cited by 15 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Such a belief leads some cognitive scientists to assume that they can simply reverse the epistemological basis of anthropology and use the anthropologist as a glorified and, why not, better organized, disciplined, and systematic research assistant, whose job is to export their experimental tasks to new cross‐cultural locations. As we have argued elsewhere (Astuti & Bloch, 2010), the idea that we can make progress “for example, by setting up permanent psychological and behavioral testing facilities in bus terminals, Fijian villages, rail stations, airports, and anywhere diverse subjects might find themselves with extra time” (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010, p. 82) is a non‐starter. Such an approach misunderstands what anthropology is and what its distinctive epistemology and methodology can contribute to cognitive science.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such a belief leads some cognitive scientists to assume that they can simply reverse the epistemological basis of anthropology and use the anthropologist as a glorified and, why not, better organized, disciplined, and systematic research assistant, whose job is to export their experimental tasks to new cross‐cultural locations. As we have argued elsewhere (Astuti & Bloch, 2010), the idea that we can make progress “for example, by setting up permanent psychological and behavioral testing facilities in bus terminals, Fijian villages, rail stations, airports, and anywhere diverse subjects might find themselves with extra time” (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010, p. 82) is a non‐starter. Such an approach misunderstands what anthropology is and what its distinctive epistemology and methodology can contribute to cognitive science.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It brings anthropologists together from across the breadth of the discipline and, teasing out the methodological challenges of comparative research, affords the further possibility of contributing to interdisciplinary large‐scale inquiry (cf. Astuti & Bloch 2010; 2015; Luhrmann 2017; 2020; Luhrmann, Padmavati, Tharoor & Osei 2015). Though the form of debate lends itself to splitting, between lumping and splitting, perhaps a lumpier and fairer conclusion is that most good anthropology does a bit of splitting and a bit of lumping too.…”
Section: Closing Statements and Responsesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Anthropologist Mary Douglas once coined the term “Bongo‐bongo‐ism” to describe the exceptionalism mentality nourished in anthropology that “in my tribe it is different” (Richards, 2008). Some hold that cultural comparisons do not help to solve interesting issues, and some even hold that comparisons should not be made at all, but that any phenomenon must be assessed in its own cultural context only (see Astuti & Bloch, 2010). With this focus on the culture‐specific, anthropology may provide useful counter‐examples for theories proposed in cognitive science, but it will not make a substantial contribution to the science of the human mind 6…”
Section: Challenges For Rapprochementmentioning
confidence: 99%