Whose programme is it? Policy ownership and conditional lending

Boughton, James M.; Mourmouras, Alex

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511493362.010

Cited by 14 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…The attitudes and reactions of various groups to IMF-supported reforms depend on their perceptions of how they will fare under the program and on the process by which programs are negotiated. A careful analysis of the number and nature of special interest groups, their reaction to reforms envisaged in IMF-supported programs, and an inclusive process of negotiation may help design better programs and improve their probability of implementation (see Boughton and Mourmouras 2004).…”

Section: Implications For Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Boughton and Mourmouras (2004) underscore the need for authentic dialogue between governments, their public, and the IFIs in identifying the problems, proposing solutions, and drawing lessons. Genuine dialogue makes the negotiated compromises between IFIs and recipient countries more likely to be regarded as legitimately representing the ultimate views of the authorities and their public.…”

Section: The Process Of Ifi Negotiationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics

Mayer

Mourmouras²

2007

Rev Int Organ

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Section: Implications For Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Process Of Ifi Negotiationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics

Mayer

Mourmouras²

2007

Rev Int Organ

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“…Ownership of reform policies, as the key to successful implementation of IFI-supported reforms, is also highlighted in the IMF's conditionality guidelines (IMF, 2002a). See also IMF (2001) and Boughton and Mourmouras (2004). also examines unconditional assistance as an alternative to conditional assistance, especially when the latter is not viable.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the viability of conditional assistance programs

Mayer¹,

Mourmouras²

2008

Routledge Studies in International Business and the World Economy

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“…Incomplete compliance can limit the improvement in a country's economic performance, adversely affect its reputation in the international capital markets, and leave it with a need for further assistance and more programs 2 . In recent years the Fund has sought to foster the concept of a country's “ownership” of a program in order to increase the government's sense of responsibility for the program's completion and success (see, for example, Khan and Sharma, 2003; Boughton and Mourmouras, 2004). The IMF's former Managing Director Horst Köhler stated that, “… The Fund is streamlining conditionality with the objective of promoting greater ownership and strengthening the implementation of programs” (IMF, 2001c, p. 5).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Promises Made, Promises Broken: A Model of Imf Program Implementation

Joyce

2006

Economics & Politics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper presents a model of the implementation of IMF programs, which is empirically tested with data from the period 1975-99. The IMF and the borrowing country are shown to have asymmetric evaluations of a program's discounted benefits, due to differences in the measurement of the benefits, the relevant time frame and appropriate discount rate. The model also distinguishes between a government that seeks to maximize national welfare and an autocracy that seeks only to benefit the ruling group. The results of the empirical analysis demonstrate that program implementation is affected by a country's trade openness, the ideological cohesion of the government, the duration of the political regime, and the degree of political openness. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may JEL: F33, O19Key words: IMF programs, conditionality PROMISES MADE, PROMISES BROKEN: A MODEL OF IMF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATIONPromises and pie-crust are made to be broken.--Jonathan Swift, Polite Conversation IntroductionThe lending programs of the International Monetary Fund have drawn a great deal of notice and criticism in recent years. 1 The disbursement of funds to the governments that enroll in these programs is linked through a procedure known as "conditionality" to their implementation of policies specified in advance. The scope and nature of these policies have expanded in recent years, and analysts such as Goldstein (2003) have examined the consequences of this extension.The IMF released a series of reports (2001a, 2001b, 2001c) reviewing the expansion of conditionality in the last decade, and agreed that there is a need to streamline the process.A related focus of attention has been the implementation of Fund programs. Incomplete compliance can limit the improvement in a country's economic performance, adversely affect its reputation in the international capital markets, and leave it with a need for further assistance and more programs. IMF Program Conditionality IMF ProgramsThe purposes of the IMF appear in the IMF's Articles of Agreement, and include international monetary cooperation, the growth of international trade, exchange stability and the establishment of a multilateral system of payments as goals. More recently, Guitián (1992) declared that the "… fundamental purpose of the institution would be to foster, and monitor the observance of, a code of conduct in international exchange and financial affairs on the part of member countries." 5 Fischer (2000) stated that the ...

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Whose programme is it? Policy ownership and conditional lending

Cited by 14 publications

References 21 publications

IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics

IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics

On the viability of conditional assistance programs

Promises Made, Promises Broken: A Model of Imf Program Implementation

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