“White and Green”: Comparison of market-based instruments to promote energy efficiency

Farinelli, U.; Johansson, Thomas B.; McCormick, Kes; Mundaca, Luis; Oikonomou, Vlasis; Örtenvik, Mattias; Patel, Martin Kumar; Santi, Federico

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2004.12.013

Cited by 59 publications

(38 citation statements)

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“…Vine and Hamrin (2008) present the experience to date with TWC schemes and outline potential opportunities in the United States. Farinelli et al (2005), Mundaca (2008) and Oikonomou et al (2007) quantify the potential for a TWC scheme, in Europe for the first two papers and in the Netherlands for the latter. To date, an analysis of the economic mechanisms at stake when implementing a TWC scheme and of its relative efficiency compared to other policy instruments seems to be lacking.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficiency and distributional impacts of tradable white certificates compared to taxes, subsidies and regulations

Giraudet¹,

Quirion²

2008

Revue d'Économie Politique

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Energy suppliers have to fund a given quantity of energy efficiency measures, or to buy so-called "white certificates" from other suppliers who exceed their target. We develop a partial equilibrium model to compare TWC schemes to other policy instruments for energy efficiency, i.e., energy taxes, subsidies on energy-saving goods and regulations fixing a minimum level of energy-efficiency. The model features an endogenous level of energy service and we analyse the influence of the substitutability between energy and energy-saving goods to produce the energy service, as well as the influence of the elasticity of demand for the energy service. We show that if the level of energy service consumption is fixed, a TWC scheme is as efficient as an energy tax, but that it is much less otherwise because it does not provide the optimal incentive to reduce the consumption of energy service. This inefficiency is worsened if energy suppliers' targets are fixed rather than proportional to the suppliers' current output. On the other hand, compared to taxes, a TWC scheme allows reaching a given level of energy savings with a lower increase in the consumers' energy price, which may ease its implementation. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficiency and distributional impacts of tradable white certificates compared to taxes, subsidies and regulations

Giraudet¹,

Quirion²

2008

Revue d'Économie Politique

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“…Finally, a TWC scheme should broadly use labeling of energy efficiency products and deposit refund schemes 18 because they can overcome knowledge and other nontechnical barriers. Some studies have dealt with the issue of interactions of TWC with other policy instruments, where more concrete lessons are to be drawn (Bertoldi et al 2005;Farinelli et al 2005;Harrisson et al 2005;Oikonomou et al 2007b;Oikonomou and van der Gaast 2008).…”

Section: Penaltymentioning

confidence: 99%

Tradable white certificate schemes: what can we learn from tradable green certificate schemes?

Oikonomou

Mundaca

2008

Energy Efficiency

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In this paper, we analyze the experiences gained from tradable green certificate (TGC) schemes and extract some policy lessons that can lead to a successful design of a market-based approach for energy efficiency improvement, alias tradable white certificate schemes. We use tradable green certificate schemes existing in the Netherlands and Sweden as case studies. Departing from an assessment of both TGC schemes, we identify several institutional and market aspects that have affected their performance. We conduct the analysis by addressing key evaluation criteria (i.e., cost and energy effectiveness, administrative burden, technological innovation, political feasibility, and transaction costs). It is not our intention to demonstrate to the reader a normative aspect of designing tradable white certificate schemes. Rather, we identify some key policy lessons which can be summarized as: a binding long-term target must be clearly expressed in terms of policy time frame and certainty, a proper liquid market must be ensured for tradability of certificates, the scheme should be technology neutral, transaction costs should be kept low, and the energy efficiency target should not only address 'low hanging fruits' but also promote innovation.

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“…Most economic studies on WhC deal with analysis of the instrument in a normative fully competitive environment (Bertoldi and Rezessy 2006;Bertoldi et al 2005; EU SAVE "White and Green" project; EuroWhiteCert project; Farinelli et al 2005;Guardiola et al 2004;Harrison et al 2005;International Energy Agency. 2006;Langniss and Praetorius 2006;Mundaca and Santi 2004;Oikonomou et al 2008, Pagliano et al 2003.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

White Certificates in the Italian Energy Oligopoly Market

Giacomo

Russolillo²,

Becchis

2012

Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy

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Abstract:In this paper we deviate from neoclassical assumptions of fully competitive energy markets, and represent a more realistic oligopolistic market, given the reconsolidation tendencies of energy companies. We focus on policies for energy efficiency improvement for electricity suppliers, namely on White Certificates. The behaviour of each supplier is based on a detailed decision tree, which determines the optimal move given the expectation on the competitor's behaviour. According to our preliminary findings, the introduction of white certificate obligations should encompass larger increases in the electricity prices. In order to test our theoretical findings we make use of a typical oligopolistic market in Italy, where we depict that a leader company can serve the main part of electricity and energy efficiency projects, through financing them with White Certificates, while the residual demand is more expensive and must be covered at a high cost from follower companies.

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“White and Green”: Comparison of market-based instruments to promote energy efficiency

Cited by 59 publications

References 1 publication

Efficiency and distributional impacts of tradable white certificates compared to taxes, subsidies and regulations

Efficiency and distributional impacts of tradable white certificates compared to taxes, subsidies and regulations

Tradable white certificate schemes: what can we learn from tradable green certificate schemes?

White Certificates in the Italian Energy Oligopoly Market

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