Which transparency matters? Compliance with anti-corruption efforts in extractive industries

Abstract

Abstract:The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) sets the standard in revenue transparency in 46 countries and works under the assumption that compliance with the initiative will improve transparency and curb corruption in member states. However, individual case studies raise doubts about the success of the initiative. Building upon the literatures on compliance and governance, this paper analyzes the impact of EITI membership on transparency and corruption levels between 2006 and 2013. By using interrupted time series and panel data analyses, this research makes an original contribution to show that affiliation with the EITI immediately improved overall aggregate data disclosure in member countries in this period. At the same time, the paper also shows that perceptions of corruption did not change. This outcome questions the effectiveness of promoting only a narrow definition of transparency in extractive industries as a measure to prevent corruption. The results imply that a more comprehensive treatment of transparency might be necessary; specifically to distinguish regimes that use transparency reforms for public relations purposes as opposed to genuine reformers.

Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Environmental and Resource Management

“…The EITI focused on disclosure (i.e., transparency) of data on revenues from extractive industries raised by governments until 2013, when the standard was modified to include further disclosure requirements for state-owned companies, transit payments, and social expenditures, as well as disaggregated reporting and improved auditing mechanisms (100).…”

“…Over the period 2006-2013, membership of the EITI resulted in improved overall aggregate data disclosure, according to an analysis that used interrupted time series and panel data methods (100). However, membership of the EITI was not statistically significant in the regression analysis that had corruption [measured with the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI)] as the dependent variable (100).…”

The role of country-level institutional factors in escaping the natural resource curse: Insights from Ghana

“…Transparency and accountability for oil resources (Belal et al, 2013;Koessler and Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2013;Cimpoeru and Cimpoeru, 2015) and financial reporting (Porter et al, 2003), including the EITI (Kasekende et al, 2016;Öge, 2016;Sovacool et al, 2016), and their influence on economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1997) and resource-curse and its possible escape (Collier et al, 2011;Al-Kasim et al, 2013;Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2014) have been widely studied. Transparency protagonists, such as Corrigan (2014) and Kasekende et al (2016) are of the view that the adoption of principles and memberships of organisations such as the EITI could help countries to escape the oil resource curse.…”

Riqueza mineral, instituições fracas e clientelismo: a maldição dos recursos naturais nos governos locais

“…Se o instituto da reeleição amplia a propensão do uso dos royalties da mineração para a distribuição de cargos comissionados, então a instituição transparência deveria mitigar esta prática. No entanto, evidenciamos que, em média, isto não ocorreu (24), resultado que está alinhado a alguns estudos anteriores que mostram que países que são mais transparentes não necessariamente têm maior crescimento econômico (Sovacool et al, 2016) ou são menos corruptos (Kasekende, Abuka & Sarr, 2016;Öge, 2016). Também apuramos que a interação entre royalties e transparência não teve qualquer efeito sobre o número de cargos comissionados (25).…”

“…De fato, iniciativas como o programa como o Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) têm argumentado que a transparência é um fator-chave para evitar a ocorrência da maldição dos recursos naturais. No entanto, há que se ressaltar que trabalhos recentes evidenciaram que países que aderiram ao EITI não necessariamente conseguiram crescer economicamente (Sovacool et al, 2016) ou reduzir a corrupção (Kasekende, Abuka & Sarr, 2016;Öge, 2016).…”