When the Tail Wags the Dog: Animal Welfare and Indirect Duty in Kantian Ethics

Abstract

Even the most sympathetic readers of Kant's moral philosophy usually disagree with him about some aspect of his theory, or some particular moral judgement. His unqualified condemnation of lying in the essay ‘On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy’ is a classical case in question, as is his strong endorsement of retributive justice and the death penalty. A third prominent source of discontent are Kant's repeated verdicts on the moral status of non-human animals, or rather the lack thereof. For, despite the fact that his practical recommendations in this field are sensible and even progressive, he repeatedly insists that there are no direct duties to animals, that the well-being of animals is morally indifferent, in particular that we ought to treat animals decently solely for the sake of humanity. As a result, the foundations of his advice seem morally inadequate, even offensive.

Non-Consequentialist Theories of Animal Ethics

“…This is contrary to whatTimmermann (2005) argues. Timmerman's article was the first (as far as I know of) to point out the distinction within theories that don't allow for the possibility of animals being wronged between those that allow that some of the things we might do to animals are non-contingently wrong and those that do not.10 Neither can Korsgaard's, since her theory relies on the contingent fact that humans endorse certain features of their animality (Nussbaum (2011a).…”

Dependence on Wrongdoing in the Consumption of Meat: A Kantian Analysis

“…Jens Timmerman, Allen Wood, and Christine Korsgaard, for example, have proposed new interpretations of Kantian principles, or additions to Kant's principles, which Kant clearly did not endorse, even if he should have. 1 Others, like Lara Denis and Dan Egonsson, have argued that we have some significant duties to be good to animals, and in particular to avoid killing and eating them under certain conditions, without revising Kant's ethics. 2 If this conclusion could be strengthened and extended such that orthodox Kantian ethics implies that we should largely or completely give up eating animals in our modern society, that would be a major blow to the philosophical defence of conventional practice.…”

Kantian Ethics and the Animal Turn. On the Contemporary Defence of Kant’s Indirect Duty View

“…(b) A second theory-transcendent approach modifies Kant's ethics significantly by adding to the central concepts of autonomy and duty some additional concepts borrowed from non-Kantian theories [13,24,33,34]. Because theory-immanent and theory-transcendent strategies introduce major revisions of Kant's ethics and sometimes twist central components of Kant's ethics beyond recognition [35] (p. 138), (c) a third Kantian approach goes back to square one and defends Kant's indirect account of our obligations to animals. Here it is argued that it is not only impossible, but also unnecessary, to establish direct duties to animals, because the Kantian notion that we have indirect duties to them has far-reaching practical consequences and is to that extent adequate.…”