When should we use agents? Direct vs. representative negotiation

Rubin, Jeffrey Z.; Sander, Frank E. A.

doi:10.1007/bf01000775

Cited by 33 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…In fact, a subject is assumed to act as a sort of agent for the person who supplied the points, instead of being an actual participant in the negotiation. When acting as an agent, a person's behavior may be different from what it would be when acting on his/her own behalf (Rubin and Sander 1991;Smith 1987). In addition, a subject could try logrolling, by comparing points and reducing the negotiation to a manipulation of figures, stating for example, "I will give you this, if you give me that, OK?," and doing this for many possible combinations of issues.…”

Section: Value Points Versus No-value Points In Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 97%

The impact of a biased starting position in a single negotiation text type mediation

Korhonen¹,

Oretskin

Teich

et al. 1995

Group Decis Negot

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Abstract.This article examines whether a biased starting position impacts the outcome of negotiations using a Single Negotiating Text (SNT) (Raiffa 1982) type, two-party mediation. Two separate experiments were conducted, one in Helsinki and one in New Mexico, that systematically tested this issue and related questions. The article argues that, if a biased starting point is not compensated for by the path taken in subsequent steps, the bias will have considerable impact on the final outcome of the negotiations. In both experiments, the mediator played a very insignificant role, since the bias was incorporated into the text prior to the initiation of the exercise. In actuality, the experimenter played the role of the mediator, but only facilitated an exchange of information between the parties. The results of our experiments strongly support the hypothesis that such bias has a significant impact on the outcome o f the negotiations. The article co ncludes by presenting suggestions for developing starting SNTs.

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Section: Value Points Versus No-value Points In Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 97%

The impact of a biased starting position in a single negotiation text type mediation

Korhonen¹,

Oretskin

Teich

et al. 1995

Group Decis Negot

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“…A representative is distinguished from an agent, as the latter does not own the problem/opportunity under negotiation and is usually retained to serve a primary party or constituent in a negotiation. Agents and primary parties have different motives and interests and can have dif ferent goals, standards and ethical norms (Chayes 1999;Fassina 2002;Kramer 1991;Mnookin and Susskind 1999;Rubin and Sander 1988). Primary parties (e.g., constituents) and their agents are analytically distinguishable as separate entities in a negotiation.…”

Section: Multiparty Negotiation Concepts and Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another important theme in the interorganizational negotiation literature -although highly underdeveloped -is the use of agents, often lawyers in Western societies, who are retained by and report back to principals or constituents (Lax and Sebenius 1986;Mnookin and Susskind 1999;Pruitt 1994;Rubin and Sander 1988). Principals retain agents for their knowledge and skill in getting things done, for the accompanying tactical benefits inherent in the principalagent relationship (e.g., information management, facesaving techniques), for their emotional detachment and for their professional reputation and ability to influence.…”

Section: Organizational and Group Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Principals retain agents for their knowledge and skill in getting things done, for the accompanying tactical benefits inherent in the principalagent relationship (e.g., information management, facesaving techniques), for their emotional detachment and for their professional reputation and ability to influence. However, the advantages derived can result in additional financial costs and greater degrees of complexity (e.g., an additional link in the communication process), which can result in potential confusion and misunderstandigs, and principal loss of control over negotiation pro cess (Croson and Mnookin 1997;Fassina 2002;Mnookin 1993;Pruitt 1994;Rubin and Sander 1988;Thompson 2001).…”

Section: Organizational and Group Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Methods have been devised to "coalign" agent and primary party interests through performancebased contracts or a contingency fee (Eisenhardt 1989;Lax and Sebenius 1986;Rubin and Sander 1988;Thompson 2001;Watkins 1999). Such methods actually shift some outcome risk from the primary party to the agent.…”

Section: Organizational and Group Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Towards a Paradigm of Multiparty Negotiation

Crump¹,

Glendon²

2003

Int Negot

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Despite considerable research on multiparty negotiation, no prior attempt has been made to organize and describe knowledge from the various disciplines represented within this field of study. The present article seeks to offer a comprehensive understanding of multiparty negotiation. It establishes a foundation for a multiparty negotiation paradigm by building a coherent multi-disciplinary framework. Development of this framework begins by defining fundamental concepts and identifying essential dynamics that structure the field of multiparty negotiation. This article then describes the building blocks and boundaries of the field. A review of the three most developed multiparty negotiation bodies of literature or domains – international negotiations, public disputes, and organizational and group negotiations – follows. Similarities and differences between the three domains are identified, as are points of theoretical integration. This examination of multiparty negotiation concepts and dynamics, building blocks, boundaries, and domains constitutes a framework that defines multiparty negotiation as a field of practice. The article also establishes a research agenda that will contribute to the development of multiparty negotiation as an area of study.

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Cautious Defection: Group Representatives Cooperate and Risk Less than Individuals

Atanasov

Kunreuther

2015

Behavioral Decision Making

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Individuals often make decisions that affect groups, yet the propensities of group representatives are not as well understood than those of independent decision makers or deliberating groups. We ask how responsibility for group payoffs-in the absence of group deliberation-affects the choice. The experiment utilizes the Interdependent Security Dilemma paradigm. In its deterministic version, the game is identical to a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. In the stochastic version, potential losses are larger but uncertain, occurring with a predefined probability when one or both players choose to forgo investment in protection. Participants were assigned to play either as individuals, or as representatives of three-person groups, with each member's choices equally likely to determine the group's payoffs. In the deterministic condition, individuals were more likely to invest (cooperate) than group representatives (80% vs. 62% of rounds). In the stochastic condition, the pattern was reversed as representatives were slightly, but not significantly, more likely to invest than individuals (46% vs. 40%). The significant interaction effect suggested that group representatives were not only less cooperative but also more risk averse than individuals. A follow-up study supported this account by showing participants who construed the invest strategy as low-risk than those who perceived this strategy to be high risk. Overall, group representatives exhibited a tendency to act more competitively and more cautiously than individuals acting alone.

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When should we use agents? Direct vs. representative negotiation

Cited by 33 publications

References 4 publications

The impact of a biased starting position in a single negotiation text type mediation

The impact of a biased starting position in a single negotiation text type mediation

Towards a Paradigm of Multiparty Negotiation

Cautious Defection: Group Representatives Cooperate and Risk Less than Individuals

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