2007
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1031681
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When Constituencies Speak in Multiple Tongues: The Relative Persuasiveness of Hawkish Minorities in Representative Negotiation

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Cited by 7 publications
(21 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…Our findings corroborate earlier work by Steinel et al (2009;Weingart et al, 2007) who also showed that hawkish factions have disproportionate influence. Steinel and colleagues proposed that hawkish messages attract more attention than dovish ones and are processed faster.…”
Section: Theoretical Contributionssupporting
confidence: 93%
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“…Our findings corroborate earlier work by Steinel et al (2009;Weingart et al, 2007) who also showed that hawkish factions have disproportionate influence. Steinel and colleagues proposed that hawkish messages attract more attention than dovish ones and are processed faster.…”
Section: Theoretical Contributionssupporting
confidence: 93%
“…Expanding earlier work by Halevy (2008) and Steinel et al (2009) we created an experimental paradigm in which representatives negotiated on behalf of a divided constituency. In some cases, representatives faced a hawkish minority in an otherwise dovish constituency; in other cases, representatives faced a dovish minority in an otherwise hawkish constituency.…”
Section: General Discussion and Conclusionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Prior research has often focused on the behavior of group representatives in the presence of competitive goals. That is, representatives were either explicitly instructed to further the interests of their own group (e.g., Vidmar, 1971); had good reason to assume that competition was the norm, for example, when competing was the only way to secure favorable outcomes for the group (e.g., Benton & Druckman, 1974;Klimoski, 1972), or when competitive incentives were more salient than cooperative ones (e.g., Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramirez-Marin, 2009). Furthermore, without explicit information about constituent expectations, peripheral negotiators tend to assume that their constituents favor a competitive approach (Holmes & Lamm, 1979;Van Kleef et al, 2007).…”
Section: Representative's Standing Within the Group: The Role Of Protmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When a group values cooperation, outgroup competition is likely to be less appreciated. Indeed, several studies showed that representatives became relatively cooperative and lenient in their negotiation behavior when they believed that their constituency favored a cooperative approach towards the outgroup (Enzle, Harvey, & Wright, 1992;Gelfand & Realo, 1999;Gruder & Rosen, 1971;Steinel et al, 2009).…”
Section: Prototypicality and Norm-congruent Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%