When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars

Brandt, Patrick T.; Mason, T. David; Gürses, Mehmet; Petrovsky, Nicolai; Radin, Dagmar

doi:10.1080/10242690701823267

Cited by 54 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…14 While some researchers opt for the more neutral "rebel organizations" label, Brandt et al 2008;cunningham, gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009;although see collier, hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004;Montalvo and reynal-Querol 2010. 13 Sinno 2008;kalyvas 2008;Brubaker 2004. an important argument in favor of this view is that rebel organizations are always present in civil wars, whether they are linked to ethnic groups or not (cunningham, gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009 While approaches rooted in the logic of security dilemmas between fixed groups tend to claim that ethnic wars will last longer, little systematic evidence has been provided in support of this assertion.…”

Section: Existing Approaches To Civil War Durationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War

Wucherpfennig¹,

Metternich²,

Cederman³

et al. 2011

World Pol.

214

196

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Previous research has focused primarily on how ethnicity may trigger civil war, and its effect on conflict duration remains disputed. Rather than treating conflict as a direct consequence of ethnic cleavages, the authors argue that ethnicity per se does not affect civil war duration. Instead, its effect depends on its relationship to political institutions. They employ a dyadic approach that emphasizes the political context in which both government leaders and nonstate challengers can capitalize on the ascriptive nature of ethnicity. They show that although states can initially benefit from politicizing ethnic relations, once violent conflict breaks out, such policies may backfire on the government and make it difficult for incumbent governments to accept settlements that could terminate conflicts. Past policies of ethnic exclusion also benefit rebel organizations fighting the government, since the resulting grievances increase collective group solidarity and render individual fighters more cost tolerant. Using a new data set that codes the nexus between rebel organizations and ethnic groups, as well as information on ethnopolitical exclusion, the authors find considerable support for their propositions.

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Section: Existing Approaches To Civil War Durationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War

Wucherpfennig¹,

Metternich²,

Cederman³

et al. 2011

World Pol.

214

196

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) found a similar effect for civil wars: the longer a civil war lasts, the less likely that nation is to experience a recurrence of civil war. That finding was confirmed in a follow-up study (Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999) and in more recent studies using updated data and a series of competing risk models (Brandt et al 2008; see also DeRouen and Sobek 2004). When governments win, they usually win early when they have a distinct advantage in military capability over a nascent rebel movement.…”

Section: International Relations Theory and Ending Civil Warsmentioning

confidence: 69%

International Relations Theory and How Civil Wars End

Mason

2009

International Interactions

Self Cite

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“…Brandt et al, 2008;Mason and Fett, 1996;Mason et al, 1999). In about one-third of civil wars, there is more than one rebel group actively battling the government at the same time (Cunningham, 2011: 13).…”

Section: How Civil Wars Endmentioning

confidence: 98%

Win, lose, or draw in the fog of civil war

Greig

Mason

Hamner

2016

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Civil war outcome studies have used expected utility logic to identify factors that affect actors' estimates of the probability of victory, the payoffs from victory vs defeat, and the accumulated costs of fighting until victory is achieved. Tests have used static measures of national attributes and war characteristics, measured prior to the war or at its end. We use UCDP Georeferenced Event Data from 73 civil conflicts in Africa to estimate how changes in government and rebel tactical choices on where and when to fight battles affect expected utility estimates and, therefore, civil war outcomes.Previous studies on the outcome of civil wars (i.e. whether they end in government victory, rebel victory, or negotiated settlement) have employed expected utility logic to identify a set of factors that should affect the choice by governments and rebels between continuing to prosecute the war or quitting, either by conceding defeat or seeking a negotiated settlement. This choice, iterated throughout the course of the conflict, is based on each party's subjective estimates of (1) the probability of victory, (2) the payoffs from victory vs defeat, and (3) the accumulated costs of fighting from the beginning of the war through the present until that time in the future when the actor anticipates s/he will be able to achieve victory. Tests based on this logic, however, have employed as predictors of civil war outcomes static

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When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars

Cited by 54 publications

References 34 publications

Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War

Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War

International Relations Theory and How Civil Wars End

Win, lose, or draw in the fog of civil war

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