2009
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9640-7
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Abstract: Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing 'detaching problems' by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for 'ought'. The semantics for 'ought' that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I arg… Show more

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Cited by 31 publications
(41 citation statements)
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References 38 publications
(35 reference statements)
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“…This analysis prompts the thought that objective normative 'ought' is an alethic modal, while subjective normative 'ought' is an epistemic modal. I explore this suggestion further in Finlay (2007b). 18 Some issues arise here from Kolmogorov's classic formulation of conditional probability as a ratio of unconditional probabilities.…”
Section: The Instrumental Oughtmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This analysis prompts the thought that objective normative 'ought' is an alethic modal, while subjective normative 'ought' is an epistemic modal. I explore this suggestion further in Finlay (2007b). 18 Some issues arise here from Kolmogorov's classic formulation of conditional probability as a ratio of unconditional probabilities.…”
Section: The Instrumental Oughtmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chrisman (2012), on the other hand, points to some problems with understanding the moral 'ought' in terms of obligation. More general worries about the identification of 'ought' with 'is required to' are raised by McNamara (1996), von Fintel and Iatridou (2008), Finlay (2010 and Ridge (2014). 14 This claim is made by Ross (1930 p.6).…”
Section: In This Paper I Have Looked At What a Supporter Of Motivatiomentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As (1), (3) and (5) illustrate, it might be perfectly natural to say that someone ought to do something while denying that he must, but as witnessed by (4) and (6), the reverse is problematic.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[12]). 3 But there seem to be (a) cases where two ordering 3 von Fintel and Iatridou [9] suggest that 'anankastic' oughts-sentences of the form 'if you want X, you ought to Y' or 'to X, you ought to Y'-are best understood to involve two ordering sources. That would let the explicit goal (X) operate on the first, thus ensuring that it isn't trumped by other goals such that to X you ought to Y comes out as true even when Ying would in no way promote X.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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