What Norm of Assertion?

Johnson, Casey Rebecca

doi:10.1007/s12136-017-0326-3

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…7 Johnson (2018) and Kelp & Simion (2020b) focus on K Rule. Maitra (2011) focuses on K Rule and T Rule.…”

Section: Ecomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since its proponents typically rely on the aforementioned analogy with the constitutive rules of a game to support CRAA, it is not surprising that a prominent line of objection against the latter consists in arguing that there are significant differences between the different versions of C Rule and the constitutive rules of a game. In this paper, I focus on a version of this objection, recently presented by Ishani Maitra (2011), Casey Rebecca Johnson (2018), and Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion (2020a;b), which can be dubbed the engagement condition objection (ECO). 6 Roughly, they each propose a necessary condition on engaging in rule-constituted activities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Assertion: The Constitutive Rule Account and the Engagement Condition Objection

Bräuer

2021

Erkenn

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Many philosophers, following Williamson (The Philosophical Review 105(4): 489–523, 1996), Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), subscribe to the constitutive rule account of assertion (CRAA). They hold that the activity of asserting is constituted by a single constitutive rule of assertion. However, in recent work, Maitra (in: Brown & Cappelen (ed). Assertion: new philosophical essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), Johnson (Acta Analytica 33(1): 51–67, 2018), and Kelp and Simion (Synthese 197(1): 125–137, 2020a), Kelp and Simion (in: Goldberg (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020b) aim to show that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, asserting is not an activity constituted by a single constitutive rule and that therefore CRAA is very likely false. To reach this conclusion, they all present a version of what can be dubbed the engagement condition objection. That is, they each propose a necessary condition on engaging in rule-constituted activities. Then they argue that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, one can make assertions without satisfying this condition. In response, I present a counterexample that shows that the proposed engagement conditions lead to counterintuitive results, and I propose an alternative that better captures our intuitions. Then I argue that this alternative engagement condition is compatible with all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion.

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“…7 Johnson (2018) and Kelp & Simion (2020b) focus on K Rule. Maitra (2011) focuses on K Rule and T Rule.…”

Section: Ecomentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assertion: The Constitutive Rule Account and the Engagement Condition Objection

Bräuer

2021

Erkenn

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“…Another objection to standard arguments is that the intuitions may underdetermine the content of the norm. Pagin (2015) and Johnson (2018) have put forth such objections against the idea that assertion can be explained in terms of its norms. Johnson argues that intuitions concerning impropriety of assertions cannot provide evidence that a certain norm is constitutive of assertion unless we are certain that the impropriety is distinctively assertoric.…”

Section: Non-standard Arguments and Bitementioning

confidence: 99%

A Credibility-Backed Norm for Testimony

Weiner

2020

Episteme

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I propose that testimony is subject to a norm that is backed by a credibility sanction: whenever the norm is violated, it is appropriate for the testifier to lose some credibility for their future testimony. This is one of a family of sanction-based norms, where violation of the norm makes it appropriate to lose some power; in this case, the power to induce belief through testimony. The applicability of the credibility norm to testimony follows from the epistemology of testimony, in that false or unjustified testimony weakens the reason for belief that is provided by the speaker's future testimony.

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“…I am ignoring this distinction in text, for ease of discussion. 9 Hindriks (2007:399), Johnson (2018) and Reiland (2019) all defend an interpretation of WILLIAMSON'S HYPOTHESIS along these lines, but proceed to make further and different claims. Hindriks goes on to argue that the C-rule (identified as the knowledge rule) is not constitutive of assertion in this sense.…”

Section: The Problem With Pollock's Distinctionmentioning

confidence: 99%