What Is It Like to Be an Artificial Intelligence? Nagel’s View From Nowhere and Artificial Intelligence as Subject of Law

Abstract

This paper has as its research problem the following question: what is it like to be an artificial intelligence? It aims to critically analyze the epistemological and semantic aspects developed by Thomas Nagel in What is it like to be a bat and The View from Nowhere, demonstrating the relationship between physicalism and subjectivity and its application to artificially intelligent beings. We chose to approach these two works because of the author's importance in analytical philosophy and the approach to consciousness. The analysis shows that the defense of artificial intelligence as a subject of law is intrinsically based on physicalism. However, in refuting it, Nagel does not offer an alternative outside the scope of dualism. Thus, the Procedural Theory of the Subject of Law is developed with stages of emancipation of the being against the law. As a result, it is verified that the reductive physicalist vision is insufficient to substantiate the condition of the subject of law of an artificial intelligence as a legal and political being in the social order. However, if the three stages of its formation (emancipation, interspecies recognition, and personification) are observed, the possibility of achieving the condition under analysis is assumed. It is concluded that it is unverifiable to know what it is like to be an artificial intelligence. In the current scientific stage, an artificially intelligent being cannot (yet) be considered a subject of law, under penalty of characterization of instrumentalism. The methodology of integrated, analytical, deductive, and bibliographic research is used to obtain these results and conclusions.

Peculiarities of determining the legal status of a robot with artificial intelligence

“…недосконалість сучасного рівня розвитку технологій ШІ не дозволяє визнати їх самостійними суб'єктами права [32]; досі існують хибні уявлення, засновані на помилковій думці про те, що втілення ШІ має якості юридичної особи [19]; на сучасному науковому етапі штучно розумна істота не може вважатися суб'єктом права під страхом характеристики інструменталізму [11].…”