We’re Number 1: Price Wars for Market Share Leadership

Cabral, Luı́s

doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2725

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(25 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Still regarding ordinal rankings, our work is related to the economics and strategy literature that studies ordinal vs. cardinal measures of success, in particular the importance of being #1(Lazear and Rosen [1981],Podolny [1993],Cabral [2014]). A strand of the strategy literature has employed ordinal ranking methodologies to assess sustained competitive advantage over multi-year periods(Ruefli and Wilson [1987],Powell and Reinhardt [2010]); by contrast, we focus on the microdynamics of weekly sales that is typical of information goods in competitive markets.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Box‐Office Demand: The Importance of Being #1

Cabral

Natividad

2016

The J Industrial Economics

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We propose a theoretical framework to understand the effect on a movie's eventual theatrical success of leading the box office during the opening weekend. We consider two possible channels: a positive shock to the utility from watching the movie and a greater awareness of the movie's existence. We derive a series of testable predictions, which we test on U.S. box office data. The results suggest that being #1 in sales during the opening weekend has an economically and statistically significant effect on the movie's total demand; and that the primary channel for this effect is through the greater awareness induced by being #1.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Box‐Office Demand: The Importance of Being #1

Cabral

Natividad

2016

The J Industrial Economics

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The price discount would entice the consumers to choose another brand and give up their current choice. Cabral noted that emphasising leadership in market share would make firms become more aggressive in pricing [10].…”

Section: Small Profit But Quick Turnovermentioning

confidence: 99%

E-commerce Price War Based on Game Theory

Liu¹

2021

Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the increasingly complex competition among firms, price war often takes place between E-commerce firms. The reasons for a price war in the E-commerce industry are various. This paper uses the game theory method to discuss the formation of competition mode and further study the possibility of price coordination behavior in the industry. These analyses to the enlightenment are that firms must pay more attention to technological innovation and product innovation to get rid of the price war trap and improve the industry competition level. At the same time, e-commerce should adopt a rational marketing strategy to avoid the destruction of the market competition environment and the loss of consumer confidence caused by an excessive price war.

show abstract

“…In parallel, a large body of literature drawing on the Carnegie tradition has investigated how managers respond to performance feedback and alter their risk‐taking behaviors (e.g., Greve, 1999; Joseph & Gaba, 2015). Similarly, recognizing the psychological and substantive importance of leadership as an individual and organizational goal, several papers have explored the antecedents of contest leadership, leaders' strategies to prevent displacement, and the actions of followers aimed at gaining it (e.g., Cabral, 2017; Wang & Shaver, 2014). In this paper, we add to these strands of literature and focus on the behavioral effect associated with the natural consequence of competition in dynamic tournaments: lost leadership.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Better to have led and lost than never to have led at all? Lost leadership and effort provision in dynamic tournaments

Gutierrez

Obłój

Frank

2020

Strategic Management Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research Summary In this paper, we develop and test a behavioral theory of lost leadership. Using insights from the literature on goals as reference points and goal‐setting theory, we predict that former leaders exert more effort compared to otherwise identical competitors. We test this prediction using two contexts. The first data comes from an educational business simulation game. The second setting draws on field data from a 2‐month banking sales contest. We find that provision of effort increases following the loss of leadership. We also explore whether past leaders exert more effort in general or shift effort from other, potentially less‐salient goals. We find evidence of both mechanisms. Finally, investigating the temporal effects, we find that having been a leader has an attenuating effect on subsequent behavior. Managerial Summary Many competitions—such as sports championships, sales contests, idea‐sourcing challenges, and competitions for promotions—can be understood as dynamic tournaments, in which rivals rise and fall in the provisional rankings as they compete over time for a terminal prize. This performance volatility can have important consequences for contestants' behavior. Focusing on the event of lost leadership, we show that former leaders try harder: those that are displaced from a prize‐eligible position exert more effort in subsequent rounds, compared with identically placed rivals who have never led. Former leaders provide more effort overall, and also shift attention away from other tasks. Our results, which suggest that setbacks can be motivational, have implications for the optimal design of dynamic competitions.

show abstract

We’re Number 1: Price Wars for Market Share Leadership

Cited by 8 publications

References 28 publications

Box‐Office Demand: The Importance of Being #1

Box‐Office Demand: The Importance of Being #1

E-commerce Price War Based on Game Theory

Better to have led and lost than never to have led at all? Lost leadership and effort provision in dynamic tournaments

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About