Voluntary formation of corporate audit committees among NASDAQ firms

Economic Agency and Audit Committees: Responsibilities and Membership Composition

“…Use of alternative operationalizations of the multinationality, leverage, asset structure and task variables produced similar results, as did variations of PINST adopting a less restrictive interpretation of instrumentality. This lack of association is contrary to the evidence provided in Pincus et al (1989) and Ettredge et al (1994) that the monitoring mechanisms of ®rms are highly correlated with proxies for agency costs.…”

Economic Agency and Audit Committees: Responsibilities and Membership Composition

“…Use of alternative operationalizations of the multinationality, leverage, asset structure and task variables produced similar results, as did variations of PINST adopting a less restrictive interpretation of instrumentality. This lack of association is contrary to the evidence provided in Pincus et al (1989) and Ettredge et al (1994) that the monitoring mechanisms of ®rms are highly correlated with proxies for agency costs.…”

On the determinants of board size and its composition: additional evidence from Ghana

“…Furthermore, the size of the firm is positively related to the size of the board but insignificantly and negatively related to the proportion of outside directors. The findings confirm studies by Pincus et al (1989), and Pearce and Zahra (1992), who indicate that larger firms tend to have larger board sizes.…”

Voluntary audit committees, auditor selection and audit quality: evidence from Taiwan

“…In addition, IN_BD it is also positively related to AC_SET it at the 1% statistically significant level, indicating that firms with a more independent board are associated with forming an audit committee. This result is similar to those of Bradbury (1990), Chau and Leung (2006), Collier (1993), Menon and Williams (1994), Pincus et al (1989) and Willekens et al (2004). Moreover, we observe that the coefficient of FI_HOLDING it is statistically significantly negative ( p < 0.05).…”

Economic Agency and Audit Committees: Responsibilities and Membership Composition

“…Use of alternative operationalizations of the multinationality, leverage, asset structure and task variables produced similar results, as did variations of PINST adopting a less restrictive interpretation of instrumentality. This lack of association is contrary to the evidence provided in Pincus et al (1989) and Ettredge et al (1994) that the monitoring mechanisms of ®rms are highly correlated with proxies for agency costs.…”

On the determinants of board size and its composition: additional evidence from Ghana

“…Furthermore, the size of the firm is positively related to the size of the board but insignificantly and negatively related to the proportion of outside directors. The findings confirm studies by Pincus et al (1989), and Pearce and Zahra (1992), who indicate that larger firms tend to have larger board sizes.…”

Voluntary audit committees, auditor selection and audit quality: evidence from Taiwan

“…In addition, IN_BD it is also positively related to AC_SET it at the 1% statistically significant level, indicating that firms with a more independent board are associated with forming an audit committee. This result is similar to those of Bradbury (1990), Chau and Leung (2006), Collier (1993), Menon and Williams (1994), Pincus et al (1989) and Willekens et al (2004). Moreover, we observe that the coefficient of FI_HOLDING it is statistically significantly negative ( p < 0.05).…”

Economic Agency and Audit Committees: Responsibilities and Membership Composition

“…Use of alternative operationalizations of the multinationality, leverage, asset structure and task variables produced similar results, as did variations of PINST adopting a less restrictive interpretation of instrumentality. This lack of association is contrary to the evidence provided in Pincus et al (1989) and Ettredge et al (1994) that the monitoring mechanisms of ®rms are highly correlated with proxies for agency costs.…”

On the determinants of board size and its composition: additional evidence from Ghana

“…Furthermore, the size of the firm is positively related to the size of the board but insignificantly and negatively related to the proportion of outside directors. The findings confirm studies by Pincus et al (1989), and Pearce and Zahra (1992), who indicate that larger firms tend to have larger board sizes.…”

Voluntary audit committees, auditor selection and audit quality: evidence from Taiwan

“…In addition, IN_BD it is also positively related to AC_SET it at the 1% statistically significant level, indicating that firms with a more independent board are associated with forming an audit committee. This result is similar to those of Bradbury (1990), Chau and Leung (2006), Collier (1993), Menon and Williams (1994), Pincus et al (1989) and Willekens et al (2004). Moreover, we observe that the coefficient of FI_HOLDING it is statistically significantly negative ( p < 0.05).…”