Violent Intermediaries and Political Order in Bangladesh

Abstract

The need for intermediaries to access resources, seek opportunities and mitigate risks has been observed in societies across the world. In poor people's lives such actors are often violent, however why this is the case remains under examined. This article offers a response to this question from Bangladesh based on an understanding of political order. When violence is not consolidated by a central state, political order stems from balancing the interests of diverse violence specialists dispersed throughout society. In such contexts mediating access to resources can be a means by which these actors accrue power and wealth, helping explain the link between intermediation and violence. This argument is developed through an ethnographic case of labourers in a large bazar at the centre of Dhaka city. The case illuminates the dynamics of political factionalism and violent mobilization within a fractious period in Bangladesh's recent history.

Becoming a violent broker: Cartels, autodefensas, and the state in Michoacán, Mexico

“…In doing so, this line of research connects with wider work showing how brokers -as violence specialists (Blok, 1974) -are instrumental to political order (Arias, 2006) as the actors able to navigate between licit and illicit, legal and illegal, public and private activities and authorities, even in contexts of violence (Auyero, 2003). Then, an emerging comparative literature has built on the "mediated state" theory (Berenschot, 2010) to specifically study the role played by violence within intermediation dynamics (Jackman, 2019) in order to show how and why violent actors tend to merge within intermediation schemes rather than looking to overthrow the political system. I will follow these arguments in order to disentangle the following set of questions regarding the Michoacán Autodefensas: in the context of the Mexican war on drugs, who are the actors actually capable of connecting the intertwined licit and illicit worlds?…”

Becoming a violent broker: Cartels, autodefensas, and the state in Michoacán, Mexico

“…In doing so, this line of research connects with wider work showing how brokers -as violence specialists (Blok, 1974) -are instrumental to political order (Arias, 2006) as the actors able to navigate between licit and illicit, legal and illegal, public and private activities and authorities, even in contexts of violence (Auyero, 2003). Then, an emerging comparative literature has built on the "mediated state" theory (Berenschot, 2010) to specifically study the role played by violence within intermediation dynamics (Jackman, 2019) in order to show how and why violent actors tend to merge within intermediation schemes rather than looking to overthrow the political system. I will follow these arguments in order to disentangle the following set of questions regarding the Michoacán Autodefensas: in the context of the Mexican war on drugs, who are the actors actually capable of connecting the intertwined licit and illicit worlds?…”

Advancement of Agri-Trading Systems Towards Improving Farmers' Economic Situations in Bangladesh

“…There is no such law or constitution in the country which will regulateAgri-market,Agri-product,theprice,andquantity (Hasanetal.,2021;Hasanetal.,2019). InBangladesh,nosuchAgriculturaltradelawwillcontrolthemarket,price,andproducts,forcing thesellersorsupplierstoselltheAgri-productsatafixedpriceandinafixedamountofquantity (Islam,2019).PricesofAgri-productsvaryfromregiontoregioninthecountryduetothemeddling oftheintermediaries,asnotradelawinBangladeshwillbounddifferenttypesoftraderstosellthe Agri-productsatafixedpricerange.Forexample,farmershavetoselltheirproductswithinaset pricerangeandselectquantitytotheultimateconsumer.Thewholesalerhastobuyafixednumber ofproductswithinthespecifiedpricerangeassignedbythegovernment.Andlastbutnotleast,the retailerhastoselltheproductswithinthepricerangeandquantitysetbythegovernment (Jackman, 2019;BadarandMustafa,2018;Wangetal.,2016). Highcropoutputcannotsustainforanextendedperiodwithoutanefficientagriculturalmarketing system.Nooutcomecanaddmuchvalueunlessitiswell-marketed.Acooperativemarketingsystem, alsoknownasacommunity-basedmarketingsystem,canbeaneffectivestrategytolessentheriskof unexpectedinterruptionsintheagriculturalproductsupplychain (MilovanovicandSmutka,2018;Suhaimeeetal.,2015).…”

Limits to and opportunities for scaling participation: lessons from three city-wide urban poor networks in Dhaka, Bangladesh

“…50. See Jackman (2018Jackman ( , 2019; Basu et al (2018); Manor (2000); Harriss (2010); and Auerbach and Thachil (2018) for further debate on the role of brokers, fixers and other political intermediaries in South Asia.…”

Becoming a violent broker: Cartels, autodefensas, and the state in Michoacán, Mexico

“…In doing so, this line of research connects with wider work showing how brokers -as violence specialists (Blok, 1974) -are instrumental to political order (Arias, 2006) as the actors able to navigate between licit and illicit, legal and illegal, public and private activities and authorities, even in contexts of violence (Auyero, 2003). Then, an emerging comparative literature has built on the "mediated state" theory (Berenschot, 2010) to specifically study the role played by violence within intermediation dynamics (Jackman, 2019) in order to show how and why violent actors tend to merge within intermediation schemes rather than looking to overthrow the political system. I will follow these arguments in order to disentangle the following set of questions regarding the Michoacán Autodefensas: in the context of the Mexican war on drugs, who are the actors actually capable of connecting the intertwined licit and illicit worlds?…”

Advancement of Agri-Trading Systems Towards Improving Farmers' Economic Situations in Bangladesh

“…There is no such law or constitution in the country which will regulateAgri-market,Agri-product,theprice,andquantity (Hasanetal.,2021;Hasanetal.,2019). InBangladesh,nosuchAgriculturaltradelawwillcontrolthemarket,price,andproducts,forcing thesellersorsupplierstoselltheAgri-productsatafixedpriceandinafixedamountofquantity (Islam,2019).PricesofAgri-productsvaryfromregiontoregioninthecountryduetothemeddling oftheintermediaries,asnotradelawinBangladeshwillbounddifferenttypesoftraderstosellthe Agri-productsatafixedpricerange.Forexample,farmershavetoselltheirproductswithinaset pricerangeandselectquantitytotheultimateconsumer.Thewholesalerhastobuyafixednumber ofproductswithinthespecifiedpricerangeassignedbythegovernment.Andlastbutnotleast,the retailerhastoselltheproductswithinthepricerangeandquantitysetbythegovernment (Jackman, 2019;BadarandMustafa,2018;Wangetal.,2016). Highcropoutputcannotsustainforanextendedperiodwithoutanefficientagriculturalmarketing system.Nooutcomecanaddmuchvalueunlessitiswell-marketed.Acooperativemarketingsystem, alsoknownasacommunity-basedmarketingsystem,canbeaneffectivestrategytolessentheriskof unexpectedinterruptionsintheagriculturalproductsupplychain (MilovanovicandSmutka,2018;Suhaimeeetal.,2015).…”

Limits to and opportunities for scaling participation: lessons from three city-wide urban poor networks in Dhaka, Bangladesh

“…50. See Jackman (2018Jackman ( , 2019; Basu et al (2018); Manor (2000); Harriss (2010); and Auerbach and Thachil (2018) for further debate on the role of brokers, fixers and other political intermediaries in South Asia.…”

Becoming a violent broker: Cartels, autodefensas, and the state in Michoacán, Mexico

“…In doing so, this line of research connects with wider work showing how brokers -as violence specialists (Blok, 1974) -are instrumental to political order (Arias, 2006) as the actors able to navigate between licit and illicit, legal and illegal, public and private activities and authorities, even in contexts of violence (Auyero, 2003). Then, an emerging comparative literature has built on the "mediated state" theory (Berenschot, 2010) to specifically study the role played by violence within intermediation dynamics (Jackman, 2019) in order to show how and why violent actors tend to merge within intermediation schemes rather than looking to overthrow the political system. I will follow these arguments in order to disentangle the following set of questions regarding the Michoacán Autodefensas: in the context of the Mexican war on drugs, who are the actors actually capable of connecting the intertwined licit and illicit worlds?…”

Advancement of Agri-Trading Systems Towards Improving Farmers' Economic Situations in Bangladesh

“…There is no such law or constitution in the country which will regulateAgri-market,Agri-product,theprice,andquantity (Hasanetal.,2021;Hasanetal.,2019). InBangladesh,nosuchAgriculturaltradelawwillcontrolthemarket,price,andproducts,forcing thesellersorsupplierstoselltheAgri-productsatafixedpriceandinafixedamountofquantity (Islam,2019).PricesofAgri-productsvaryfromregiontoregioninthecountryduetothemeddling oftheintermediaries,asnotradelawinBangladeshwillbounddifferenttypesoftraderstosellthe Agri-productsatafixedpricerange.Forexample,farmershavetoselltheirproductswithinaset pricerangeandselectquantitytotheultimateconsumer.Thewholesalerhastobuyafixednumber ofproductswithinthespecifiedpricerangeassignedbythegovernment.Andlastbutnotleast,the retailerhastoselltheproductswithinthepricerangeandquantitysetbythegovernment (Jackman, 2019;BadarandMustafa,2018;Wangetal.,2016). Highcropoutputcannotsustainforanextendedperiodwithoutanefficientagriculturalmarketing system.Nooutcomecanaddmuchvalueunlessitiswell-marketed.Acooperativemarketingsystem, alsoknownasacommunity-basedmarketingsystem,canbeaneffectivestrategytolessentheriskof unexpectedinterruptionsintheagriculturalproductsupplychain (MilovanovicandSmutka,2018;Suhaimeeetal.,2015).…”

Limits to and opportunities for scaling participation: lessons from three city-wide urban poor networks in Dhaka, Bangladesh

“…50. See Jackman (2018Jackman ( , 2019; Basu et al (2018); Manor (2000); Harriss (2010); and Auerbach and Thachil (2018) for further debate on the role of brokers, fixers and other political intermediaries in South Asia.…”