2015
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-19249-9_20
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Verifying the Safety of a Flight-Critical System

Abstract: This paper describes our work on demonstrating verification technologies on a flight-critical system of realistic functionality, size, and complexity. Our work targeted a commercial aircraft control system named Transport Class Model (TCM), and involved several stages: formalizing and disambiguating requirements in collaboration with domain experts; processing models for their use by formal verification tools; applying compositional techniques at the architectural and component level to scale verification. Per… Show more

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Cited by 26 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…As such, written requirements or specifications for the autopilot and controls software have not been developed. For our case study, we concentrated on 5 properties derived from [8]. Out of the 5 properties, PKind were able to prove only one property directly.…”
Section: Tcm Longitudinal Controlsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…As such, written requirements or specifications for the autopilot and controls software have not been developed. For our case study, we concentrated on 5 properties derived from [8]. Out of the 5 properties, PKind were able to prove only one property directly.…”
Section: Tcm Longitudinal Controlsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We use the bounded model checking (BMC) engine of PKind to find test cases that satisfy the MC/DC coverage criterion. Bounded model checking may not be able to find a test case for some condition within an acceptable time limit 8 . In such cases, we conclude that the generated test suite does not reach the MC/DC coverage.…”
Section: Dynamic Analysis Via E-acsl Annotationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…TCM. We have generated 2 safe benchmarks from the Simulink models (taken from the case study [6]) by first generating the C code using the Embedded Coder 7 and then encoding the program into a symbolic transition system. Results.…”
Section: From Satisfiability To Verificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It addresses the automatic expression and computation of robustness properties for SISO (single-input single-output) systems over the code artifact. This class of systems is well studied and is representative enough of the realistic-size systems we are targeting, such as the NASA Transport Class Model [5], the ROSACE usecase [17], or industry-level Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC).…”
Section: Robustnessmentioning
confidence: 99%