Upgrading security at nuclear power plants in the newly independent states

Bukharin, Oleg

doi:10.1080/10736709708436663

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…By not pressing for fundamental institutional change and offering only bandaid solutions to diminish the perceived immediate risks, the international community has, knowingly or not, committed environmental appeasement, resulting in both the postponement and shifting, both spatially and in type, the environmental security risk associated with post-Soviet nuclear facilities. While short-term security risks at Eastern European nuclear installation may have diminished, both the environmental degradation and increased risks have been moved to those communities east of the Urals, without even a semblance of a long-term plan to alleviate continued risks (Bukharin, 1997b).…”

Section: Environmental Appeasement and Nuclear Safetymentioning

confidence: 98%

Threat level green: Conceding ecology for security in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

Schrad

2006

Global Environmental Change

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Section: Environmental Appeasement and Nuclear Safetymentioning

confidence: 98%

Threat level green: Conceding ecology for security in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

Schrad

2006

Global Environmental Change

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“…The attack was claimed to be intended to highlight the vulnerability of the facility to possible cyber attacks and did not result in major damage for the installation. However, the potential consequences of a similar offensive has been recognized to be catastrophic [Bukharin (1997)]. In July 2002 Microsoft reported a software security vulnerability in SQL server.…”

Section: Recent Incidentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nuclear Facilities and Cyber Threats

Tolo¹,

Andrews²

2019

Proceedings of the 29th European Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL)

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The exponential growth of digital technologies experienced in the last decades has shaped contemporary societies so thoroughly to earn the definition of digital revolution or third industrial revolution. Along with the penetration rate of digital technologies, concerns about systems' vulnerability and the disruptive potential of malicious attacks have rapidly risen among governments and industries as much as in the eye of public opinion. Such concerns are all the more motivated when referring to the nuclear power industry which, due to historical and safety reasons, appears to be more unprepared and vulnerable to cyber threats than its industrial counterparts. While the isolation of plants' control network from the public internet, generally referred as air-gap, has for long nurtured the belief of security of nuclear power plants, recent events (e.g. Stuxnet worm) have shown the inadequacy of this countermeasure. Moreover, the progressive shift from obsolete analogue industrial and control systems to digital solutions, and the growing capabilities of attackers, are exacerbating the urge for novel strategies able to overcome the inadequacy of traditional risk assessment techniques in addressing such threats. This study focuses on cyber security challenges peculiar to the nuclear industry and argues the need for novel tools and radically new approaches to assess and mitigate the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to cyber threats. In order to achieve a full understanding of common attack mechanisms, relevant cyber threats targeting the instrumentation and control system of a generic nuclear power plant have been modelled graphically using a Petri net approach.

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“…It is important to bear in mind that sabotaging modern nuclear reactors, which feature redundant safety functions, would require profound know-how, including knowledge of which equipment would need to be destroyed to cause a reactor meltdown and where it is located (Bukharin 1997). There is no firm evidence that Chechnya-based radical separatists have such knowledge, although they may be trying to obtain it.…”

Section: Possible Attack Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia: Grasping the Reality of Nuclear Terror

Saradzhyan¹

2006

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Scie

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Radical separatists based in the North Caucasus have the motive and are seeking the means to commit an act of nuclear terrorism as well as allies to help them carry it out. Their proximity to insufficiently secured Russian nuclear facilities and their contents makes the prospect of nuclear terror in Russia very real. This article assesses the magnitude of this threat, considers possible attack scenarios, and suggests ways to reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic attack on Russian soil.

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Upgrading security at nuclear power plants in the newly independent states

Cited by 6 publications

References 1 publication

Threat level green: Conceding ecology for security in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

Threat level green: Conceding ecology for security in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

Nuclear Facilities and Cyber Threats

Russia: Grasping the Reality of Nuclear Terror

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