Understanding the nature of cooperation variability

Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Hansen, Lars Gårn; Wengström, Erik

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.09.004

Cited by 46 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…14 As such, the potential malleability of types might constitute a challenge when trying to assess the empirical relevance of certain behavioral theories (e.g., pure outcome-oriented models), since such tests usually need to rely on a selection of data from different kinds of games. Given the importance of such assessments, we believe that one should try to learn more about why (or which) people react to differences in framing, so that these relevant factors could be controlled for (e.g., see Fosgaard et al 2014).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames

2015

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Leadership mechanisms provide a potential means to mitigate social dilemmas, but empirical evidence on the success of such mechanisms is mixed. In this paper, we explore the institutional frame as a relevant factor for the effectiveness of leadership. We compare subjects' behavior in public-goods experiments that are either framed positively (give-some game) or negatively (take-some game). We observe that leader and follower decisions are sensitive to the institutional frame. Leaders contribute less in the take-some game, and the correlation between leaders' and followers' contribution is weaker in the take-some game. Additionally, using a strategy method to elicit followers' reactions at the individual level, we find evidence for the malleability of followers' revealed cooperation types. Taken together, the leadership institution is found to be less efficient in the take-than in the give-frame, both in games that are played only once and repeatedly.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames

2015

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“…Allison and Messick, 1985;Dufwenberg et al, 2011;Khadjavi and Lange, forthcoming), while others find little difference (e.g. Fleishman, 1988;Cubitt et al, 2011;Cox et al, 2013;Stoddard, 2014;Fosgaard et al, forthcoming). Some studies find the opposite (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Decomposing the effects of negative framing in linear public goods games

Cox

2015

Economics Letters

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The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. DECOMPOSING THE EFFECTS OF NEGATIVE FRAMING IN LINEAR PUBLIC GOODS GAMESCALEB A. COX* ABSTRACT. I examine two dimensions of framing in public goods games: Contributing vs. Taking and Gains vs. Losses. I find decreased cooperation under the Taking frame, but not under the Loss frame. This framing effect is stronger for men than women.

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“…Similarly, Gächter, Kölle, and Quercia (2017) [11] found that framing the public good game as a Maintenance or a Provision problem affects the elicited contribution profiles. 5 Different kinds of framing effects have been shown to affect contributions in public good games (e.g., Andreoni 1995 [14]; Ellingsen et al, 2012 [15]; Dufwenberg et al 2011 [16]; Fosgaard, Hansen,Wengström, 2014 [17]; Nikiforakis, 2010 [18]). For an extensive list of references, see Cartwright (2016) [19].…”

Section: The Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conditional Cooperation and Framing Effects

Dariel

2018

Games

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This paper presents evidence from a lab experiment investigating whether the preeminence of conditional cooperators in studies using the method of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001, Economics Letters) is sensitive to changes in the experimental frame. The treatments vary the framing such that the salience of conditionality to subjects is reduced. The results show that these manipulations affect the distribution of elicited types. However, there is no evidence that the framing of Fischbacher et al. overestimates the fraction of conditional cooperators compared to the other frames considered in the experiment. Furthermore, this research finds that conditional contributions elicited using the Fischbacher et al. (2001) frame are the most consistent with contributions in a one-shot public good game.

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Understanding the nature of cooperation variability

Cited by 46 publications

References 34 publications

Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames

Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames

Decomposing the effects of negative framing in linear public goods games

Conditional Cooperation and Framing Effects

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