Under what conditions does bureaucracy matter in the making of global public policies?

Abstract

This study investigates how configurations of bureaucratic autonomy, policy complexity and political contestation allow international public administrations (IPAs) to influence policymaking within international organizations. A fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 17 policy decisions in four organizations (FAO, WHO, ILO, UNESCO) shows that all IPAs studied can be influential in favorable contexts. When policies are both contested and complex, even IPAs lacking autonomy can influence policy. If either complexity or contestation is absent, however, it is the variant of autonomy of will that helps the IPA exploit procedural strategies of influence. Low autonomy of will, among other factors, explains why IPAs cannot exert influence.Conversely, the variant of autonomy of action appears largely irrelevant. The study provides new insights into the role of bureaucracy beyond the state, exemplifying how research of bureaucratic influence can yield more systematic results in various empirical settings.

Means of Bureaucratic Influence

“…In this context, researchers typically refer to principalagent models and highlight the structural relationship between the IPA and its political principals, the member states, expressed in terms of the formal powers and resources member states surrender to the IPA and the control functions they install (Abbott and Snidal 1998;Hawkins et al 2006a;Hooghe and Marks 2015;Jankauskas 20222;McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989;Stone 2011). In particular, the literature on the rational design of IGOs would expect a higher potential for bureaucratic influence, the higher the levels of formal autonomy of IPAs rise (see, e.g., Ege et al 2023;Haftel and Thompson 2006;Johnson 2013;Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001).…”

International Public Administrations in Environmental Governance

“…In this context, researchers typically refer to principalagent models and highlight the structural relationship between the IPA and its political principals, the member states, expressed in terms of the formal powers and resources member states surrender to the IPA and the control functions they install Hooghe and Marks 2015;Jankauskas 20222;McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989;. In particular, the literature on the rational design of IGOs would expect a higher potential for bureaucratic influence, the higher the levels of formal autonomy of IPAs rise (see, e.g., Ege et al 2023;Haftel and Thompson 2006;Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001).…”

Institutional leadership during tough times

“…Second, there is now a mainstream view that IOs have agency and that their bureaucracies can influence their decision-and policy-making processes (Bauer and Ege, 2016;Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009;Chorev, 2012;Eckhardt et al, 2021;Ege, 2020;Ege et al, 2022;Jinnah, 2012;Knill and Bauer, 2016;Knill et al, 2019;Knill and Steinebach, 2022;Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019). Thus, in studying IO responses to challenges, accounting for the causal influence of institutional leaders and their supporting bureaucracies would be a logical first step.…”

“…These studies strengthened the view that IOs are not mere extensions of states nor simple fora through which states engage in power politics, but are instead actors in their own right with autonomous preferences Finnemore, 1999, 2004;Bauer and Ege, 2016). They highlight how IOs play an important role in global affairs, such as through agenda setting (Pollack, 1997;Reinalda and Verbeek, 1998), adjudication (Alter, 2001), direct and indirect contributions to decision-and policy-making processes (Bauer and Knill, 2007;Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009;Ege et al, 2021;Ege et al, 2022;Finnemore, 1996;Hazelzet, 1998;Knill and Steinebach, 2022;Moloney, 2022;Xu and Weller, 2008), and as enforcers of international agreements (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004).…”

“…In fact, they strongly support recent studies on the resilience of IOs operating in other policy arenas, such as security (e.g., Schütte, 2021aSchütte, , 2022 Second, the insights generated by the dissertation contribute to the IR literature on bureaucratic politics by revealing the specific roles played by institutional leadership in IO responses to challenges. Recent decades have seen a proliferation of studies on the influence of institutional actors in global decision-and policy-making processes (Bauer and Ege, 2016;Bayerlein et al 2020;Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009;Chorev, 2012;Eckhardt et al, 2021;Ege, 2020;Ege et al, 2022;Jinnah, 2010Johnson and Urpelainen, 2014;Knill and Bauer, 2016;Knill et al, 2019;Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019). These have strengthened the view that IOs are not mere extensions of states nor simple fora through which states engage in power politics, but are instead actors in their own right with increasing autonomy and authority Finnemore, 1999, 2004;Bauer and Ege, 2016;Hooghe et al 2017;Zürn, Tokhi, and Binder 2021).…”