Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis for Rumor Spreading on Weibo Based on MA-PT

Abstract

With the rapid development of social media, Weibo rumors have increasingly attracted widespread attention. To maintain sustainable development of network ecology, it is necessary to clarify the evolution law of rumor propagation. First, evolutionary game model is applied to examine the interaction mechanisms of complex behaviors between Weibo rumor makers, Weibo users and governments in accordance with MA-PT (Mental Accounts and Prospect Theory). Next, the replication dynamic equation is used to solve the equilibrium strategy points of each player. It was found that the evolution game does not have a stable equilibrium point. Finally, we conduct empirical simulation to verify the model and primary conclusions. Results demonstrate that, 1) The reference value plays an important role in the strategic choices of players.2) With the high value of psychological satisfaction of "Herding effect", Weibo users choose to repost rumors.3) Increasing the value of punishment, Weibo rumor makers are less likely to adopt the strategy of making rumors. 4) The higher loss of social unrest can encourage governments to adopt strict management strategies to maintain good online order. The results can guide governments to make better decisions in network governance.

A study on the competitive dissemination of disinformation and knowledge on social media

“…The initial values of the parameters are set as =0.6, C1=0.3 and C2=0.3, and the initial values are set as (0.1,0.6), (0.3,0.5), (0.5,0.1), (0.4,0.9) and (0.6,0.5) (Zhao et al. , 2021a, b). The four conclusions are numerically simulated respectively, and the results are shown in Figure 2.…”

“…Third, this paper focuses on social media users, which is different from previous studies that focus on the game between the public and other subjects, such as the public and the government (Zhao et al. , 2021a, b), the public and social platforms (Yang et al. , 2019), enterprises and consumers (Li et al.…”

“…, 2015) and plays a critical role in behavior decisions of disinformation makers (Zhao et al. , 2021a, b).…”

Co-Evolutionary Mechanism of Stakeholders’ Strategies in Comprehensive Agricultural Water Price Reform: The View of Evolutionary Game Based on Prospect Theory

“…This approach provides more accurate predictions and decision-making analyses that align with the actual situation. Many scholars have already combined evolutionary game theory with mental accounting and prospect theory to analyze and predict various social issues [48,49]. Since evolutionary games involve human behavioral decision making among different groups, which inevitably includes irrational behavior, adopting the MA-PT theory to study the behavioral decision making of the government, farmers, and water supply units in the comprehensive agricultural water price reform is indeed applicable.…”

“…U 1 in the loss account L(x) represents the base value of the losses, κ is the sensitivity of loss aversion, and γ and δ are the risk appetite coefficients for losses; U 2 in the return account G(x) represents the benchmark value of the returns, τ is the sensitivity of loss aversion, and ϕ and ζ are the risk appetite coefficients for returns [49].…”