Transitive inferences from narrative relations.

Abstract

Inferences drawn while reading artificial set inclusion passages tend to be different than those made when reasoning with categorical syllogisms and linear orderings even though all three describe transitive relations. The present study tests the hypothesis that this disparity results from reasoners' perceptions of the commonality among category terms. In three experiments, students were given artificial set inclusion paragraphs that either contained convergent category terms that possess a common superordinate, similar to what is found in syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Revlin, Ammerman, Petersen, & Leirer, 1978), or they were given divergent category terms that do not possess a common superordinate (similar to Griggs, 1976a). The perceived commonality among the category terms affected the interpretations of the narrative relations and determined the pattern of inferences that students were willing to draw.

Transitive inferences from set-inclusion relations and working memory.

“…When classinclusion relations are expressed so as to emphasize a commonality among the categories (e.g., officers in the Leptus Party, officers in the Terran Coalition, officers in the Rockite Party), participants tend to draw the appropriate inferences. However, we do not think that the improvements that Nguyen and Revlin (1993) observed are due solely to the use of categories that the participants clearly recognize as convergent. Instead, we believe that the texts we have used enable participants to see that the categories all belong to a single superordinate category (i.e., the pieces in a game).…”

“…Thus, the hypothesis of the use of varied interpretative rules situates interparticipant differences at the level of the comprehension of the relation in the same way as that proposed by Potts (1976) or Newstead and Griggs (1984). In fact, the hypothesis proposed by Nguyen and Revlin (1993) is that the use of Rule 3 by the majority of participants in earlier experiments (in particular those that use the Fundalas text as This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.…”

“…Finally, we compare this hypothesis with Nguyen and Revlin's (1993) proposal concerning interparticipant variability in the interpretation of the inclusion relation.…”

Relational learning with and without awareness: Transitive inference using nonverbal stimuli in humans

“…In verbal TI tasks, however, the relationships expressed in the premise pairs (e.g., longer than, better than, etc.) provide strong clues that a hierarchy can be formed among all the stimuli (Kallio, 1982;Nguyen & Revlin, 1993). Our nonverbal TI task provides no such inherent clues and thus does not bias participants toward forming overt hierarchical orderings.…”

Counterfactual Reasoning: resolving inconsistency before your eyes

“…Although people reason differently depending on whether or not the facts are artificial and/or arbitrary (e.g., Nguyen & Revlin, 1993;Revlis & Hayes, 1972;Wilkins, 1928), there is no independent standard of artificiality and how it relates to believability. Unless we have such a standard in place, we will not be sure when and how someone will decide which of their beliefs are candidates for revision.…”