Trading mechanisms for bottleneck permits with multiple purchase opportunities

Wang, Pengfei; Wada, Koh; Akamatsu, Takashi; Nagae, Takeshi

doi:10.1016/j.trc.2018.07.011

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…An approach grounded in mechanism design will help shed light on this analytically. We have not seen this problem attacked in the lane-changing literature, but similar ideas have appeared recently in relation to bottleneck trading (Wang et al, 2018) and platooning of connected vehicles (Sun and Yin, 2019). That the outcome of the games depends on communicated VOTs creates opportunities to game the system and it might be possible to engage in multiple transactions and exploit arbitrage opportunities.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Pay to change lanes: A cooperative lane-changing strategy for connected/automated driving

Lin,

Li,

Jabari

2019

Preprint

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This paper proposes a cooperative lane changing strategy using a transferable utility games framework. This allows vehicles to engage in transactions where gaps in traffic are created in exchange for monetary compensation. The proposed approach is best suited to discretionary lane change maneuvers. We formulate gains in travel time, referred to as time differences, that result from achieving higher speeds. These time differences, coupled with value of time, are used to formulate a utility function, where utility is transferable. We also allow for games between connected vehicles that do not involve transfer of utility. We apply Nash bargaining theory to solve the latter. A cellular automaton is developed and utilized to perform simulation experiments that explore the impact of such transactions on traffic conditions (travel-time savings, resulting speed-density relations and shock wave formation) and the benefit to vehicles. The results show that lane changing with transferable utility between drivers can help achieve win-win results, improve both individual and social benefits without resulting in any adverse effects on traffic characteristics in general and, in fact, result in slight improvement at traffic densities outside of free-flow and (bumper-to-bumper) jammed traffic.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Pay to change lanes: A cooperative lane-changing strategy for connected/automated driving

Lin,

Li,

Jabari

2019

Preprint

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“…A few auction-based mechanisms are also proposed to manage the bottleneck traffic. In [37], the peak period is divided into small intervals and travelers may bid for each interval over multiple days. To promote ride-sharing, [38] designs a mechanism that jointly determines the permit allocation and the shared trip assignment.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

CARMA: Fair and efficient bottleneck congestion management with karma

Elokda¹,

Cenedese²,

Zhang³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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In this paper, we propose a traffic demand management scheme, named CARMA, to address the morning commute congestion with heterogeneous travelers. We introduce karma as a non-tradable mobility credit used by the commuters to bid for access to a fast lane that is kept in free-flow. Commuters who did not bid enough to enter the fast lane instead use a slow lane in which they might experience congestion. At the end of each day, the karma spent by those entering the fast lane is evenly redistributed to all commuters, and this process repeats indefinitely. A core novelty of our approach is that we generalize the notion of Value of Time (VOT) by allowing it to vary dynamically each day, e.g., as a function of the trip purpose, rather than being a static characteristic of each individual. This allows us to asses the efficiency and fairness of the system over the long-term instead of based on a single day. We formalize the recurrent interactions among self-interested commuters as a dynamic population game, and prove the existence of a Stationary Nash Equilibrium (SNE). We then investigate the performance of CARMA through three numerical case studies with different assumptions on the heterogeneity in VOT. Our results demonstrate that CARMA closely approaches the efficiency of classical optimal congestion pricing, while preventing individuals with a higher (monetary) VOT from consistently taking advantage of the fast lane, thereby providing a fair and efficient solution to the bottleneck congestion.

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“…However, it suffers from the same drawback as road pricing. The traffic volume cannot be completely controlled, and there is potential information asymmetry between road managers and users [5] [17].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are two main types of transportation demand management schemes [5]. One is pricebased regulation, such as road pricing and congestion pricing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Dynamic Travel Permits Allocation Mechanism for Decreasing Traffic Congestion and Drivers’ Dissatisfaction

Yamanari

Nishino

Hayashi

2022

International Journal of Smart Computing and Artificial Intelligence

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An increasing number of people live in urban cities, and this trend is predicted to continue exponentially. However, such a tendency adversely influences infrastructure, such as roads, causing severe traffic congestion in some cities. In this paper, we present a new travel permit allocation mechanism to alleviate traffic congestion, especially during the rush hour of an urban area. This method aims to decrease drivers' dissatisfaction compared to existing odd-and-even license plate restrictions that mechanically assign the right of travel while maintaining the alleviated traffic congestion. To adequately allocate travel permits to each driver, we combined auction and personal trading to respond to time-series changes in the participants' schedules. We evaluated the efficiency of the mechanism by multi-agent simulation from the two perspectives of traffic congestion and agent satisfaction score, which represents the degree of matching between the agents' schedules and their actual acquisition status of the travel permits. We experimented in two cases in which agents' departure points were uniformly distributed and unevenly distributed, and confirmed that the proposed method improves the agent satisfaction score while limiting the number of vehicles to decrease traffic congestion.

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Trading mechanisms for bottleneck permits with multiple purchase opportunities

Cited by 15 publications

References 24 publications

Pay to change lanes: A cooperative lane-changing strategy for connected/automated driving

Pay to change lanes: A cooperative lane-changing strategy for connected/automated driving

CARMA: Fair and efficient bottleneck congestion management with karma

Dynamic Travel Permits Allocation Mechanism for Decreasing Traffic Congestion and Drivers’ Dissatisfaction

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