TRADE POLICY STRATEGIES AND ENFORCEMENT CHOICES: An Examination of the 1992 Steel Antidumping Cases

Brook, Douglas A.

doi:10.1080/08853900390152818

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 7 publications

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“…Newer "minimills" make steel in electric arc furnaces using scrap steel as the primary feedstock. 5 See Brook (1998Brook ( ), (2003Hogan (1994). 6 Moore (1995): 73 -132. increased 89.5 percent, and imports from Russia went up 50.6 percent.…”

Section: -2002 Steel Trade Policy Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Meta-Strategic Lobbying: The 1998 Steel Imports Case

Brook

2005

Bus. polit.

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In 1998, the domestic steel industry in the United States devised and executed a complex and sophisticated effort to achieve an effective non-market response to a sudden, persistent, and damaging surge of imported steel. This campaign lasted until 2002, when President George W. Bush invoked Section 201 of the U.S. trade laws to impose tariffs on imports of most steel products. This case of the steel industry's trade policy campaign provides an opportunity to examine selected models of protection-seeking industries and lobbying to ask why and how the steel coalition achieved this extraordinary governmental response. These questions are explored though a descriptive case of the steel industry's protection-seeking campaign followed by a comparative examination of previous models of protection-seeking firms, and lobbying to achieve protectionist policies. A comparison with selected models of the determinants of protectionseeking and factors affecting lobbying strategies show that most, almost all, were present in the steel case. In fact, a meta-strategic approach that transcends the customary understanding of lobbying is suggested in a complex policy environment. Such an environment can be characterized by: the need to influence multiple governmental entities -legislative, regulatory, executive; the desire for multiple outcomes with varying levels of specificity -laws or resolutions, administrative rulings, policy choices; interactions between different levels and branches of government; employment of coordinated interrelated lobbying techniques; and simultaneity of these factors.

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Section: -2002 Steel Trade Policy Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Meta-Strategic Lobbying: The 1998 Steel Imports Case

Brook

2005

Bus. polit.

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Dumping and Subsidy Cases at the ITC: Voting Discretion and Commissioner Attributes

Brook

2005

The International Trade Journal

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In antidumping and countervailing duty cases, why do commissioners of the International Trade Commission vote as they do? Commissioners are presented with the same petitions, listen to the same oral arguments, have access to the same economic data, and operate under the same trade laws. Yet there is variability in voting behavior. Political economy models have left an incomplete understanding of ITC voting and recent literature suggests there may be attributes of the commissioners that explain their voting behavior. This study of votes on antidumping and countervailing duty cases between 1992 and 1999 looks at five such attributes: political party, party of the appointing president, prior employment on Capitol Hill, profession as lawyers, and prior employment in business and labor organizations. Applying a statistical analysis reveals that, of these five variables, only prior affiliation with business and labor organizations and political party appear related to ITC Commissioners'voting patterns.

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Bureaucratic politics, policy learning, and changes of antidumping policy and rules in Japan

Song

Lee

2013

Journal of International Trade Law and Policy

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PurposeThis paper aims to deepen understanding of the interrelated questions: how Japanese antidumping policies have been formulated and transformed; what the reasons are for such caution in adopting antidumping measures; and what patterns can be observed of recent changes in antidumping policy and legal systems.Design/methodology/approachTo explain the changes in antidumping policy and rules in Japan, this paper examines not only political competition among bureaucratic organizations but also policy learning by bureaucratic organizations and their effects on change in policy preferences and advancements in the legal system.FindingsThe effects of bureaucratic politics and policy learning not only complexly interact but also are highly complicated to initiate policy changes in accordance with the maturity of antidumping legal system. In this case study, the policy learning has led the rival bureaucrats to a consensus to change antidumping policy and legal system, but the agreement could be a temporal truce that may easily collapse by political contingencies.Originality/valueAlong with the influences of large‐scale economic and political dynamisms, this paper focuses on two aspects of the policy subsystem to explain those changes: one is political competition among bureaucratic organizations claiming jurisdiction of antidumping policy; the other is the effect of policy learning among bureaucratic organizations on changes in policy preferences and on advancements in antidumping rules.

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TRADE POLICY STRATEGIES AND ENFORCEMENT CHOICES: An Examination of the 1992 Steel Antidumping Cases

Cited by 3 publications

References 7 publications

Meta-Strategic Lobbying: The 1998 Steel Imports Case

Meta-Strategic Lobbying: The 1998 Steel Imports Case

Dumping and Subsidy Cases at the ITC: Voting Discretion and Commissioner Attributes

Bureaucratic politics, policy learning, and changes of antidumping policy and rules in Japan

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