Trade credit financing and coordination for an emission-dependent supply chain

Cao, Erbao; Yu, Miaojie

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2018.03.024

Cited by 115 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Chauhan and Singh [49] summarized the model-based research on coordination mechanisms in sustainable supply chains and provided an in-depth analysis of the widely-used models. In terms of the cap-and-trade mechanism, Cao and Yu [50] constructed three different contracts to investigate the operational decision of one manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in an emission-dependent supply chain. The results showed that a revenue-sharing contract can achieve Pareto improvement of the total profit under certain conditions.…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint Emission Reduction Strategy in Green Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation

2020

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Under the threat of global warming, joint emission reduction strategy has been widely adopted as an effective solution for the industry to guarantee environmental sustainability. In the practice of supply chain, environmental regulations and supply chain contracts are applied with the attempt to improve environmental performance. However, whether these measures are actually effective remains unanswered. In this paper, we study a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer adopting joint emission reduction strategy. We first investigate under what circumstance the environmental regulation can effectively result in higher emission reduction efforts. The result shows that when the cost coefficient satisfies certain conditions, the increase of penalty or subsidy can lead to more investment in emission reduction. In addition, if the environmental impact caused by the production process is extremely high, the enforcement of the regulation is ineffective. We also explore how the cost-revenue-sharing contract affects the emission reduction strategy and the coordination of the members in the supply chain. The results suggest that the incentive effect of environmental regulation is more effective when the supply chain coordination contract exists. Numerical experiments are also presented to verify our analytical conclusions.

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Section: Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint Emission Reduction Strategy in Green Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation

2020

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“…García-Alvarado et al [29] discuss enterprises' pricing strategy by solving a Markov decision problem under di erent emission regulations. Cao and Yu [33] study a manufacturer's wholesale pricing strategy considering the impact of capital constraint. Qi et al [34] analyze a manufacturer's wholesale pricing decision and retailers' retail pricing decision under cap-and-trade scheme.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social Learning

Chen

2019

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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In an uncertainty market, social learning plays a signi cant role in obtaining information to make better decisions. Under cap-and-trade regulation, this paper aims to investigate rms' pricing and carbon emission abatement issues considering the impact of social learning. is paper establishes a two-period model in a market consisting of a manufacturer and heterogeneous consumers. e manufacturer produces two alternatives (ordinary product and low-carbon product) and makes decisions on sales prices and carbon emission abatement levels. Consumers make decisions on whether and which product to buy. Consumers are not sure about their valuations of products and have the opportunity to discover their true valuation by social learning. e results show that the emission abatement level on ordinary product is a ected by the pricing strategy for both types of products. However, the emission abatement level on low-carbon product is only a ected by its own pricing strategy. It also shows that social learning lowers the emission abatement level on ordinary product, whereas it improves the emission abatement level on low-carbon product when charging a high price for low-carbon product. Moreover, the price of ordinary product in period 1 is no less than that in period 2. In contrast, the price of low-carbon product in period 2 is higher than that in period 1.Hindawi

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“…Gong and Zhou [20] investigate the impacts of carbon emission trading on firms' production planning and find that Mathematical Problems in Engineering 3 the optimal base-stock level is independent of the emission permits. Cao and Yu [21] analyze the capital-constrained retailer's optimal ordering quantities under cap-and-trade regulation. Du et al [22] study an enterprise's production decision under cap-and-trade regulation.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

2018

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Under cap-and-trade regulation, this paper investigates information sharing issues in supply chains with different structures. Adopting a game-theoretic method, we start the analysis from a simple bilateral monopoly supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The model is then extended to a scenario with two competing retailers. The manufacturer provides the wholesale price and invests in carbon emission abatement level. The retailers order products to meet consumers' demand in an uncertain market. One retailer has the power to obtain private information. The results show that the wholesale price and the carbon emission abatement level respond positively to the demand signal. We find that the well-informed retailer is better off with low-demand information sharing and worse off with high-demand information sharing in a bilateral monopoly supply chain. However, the well-informed retailer can benefit from high-demand information sharing in a competitive environment. We also find that the uninformed retailer may get hurt from information sharing under certain conditions. Moreover, the manufacturer's expected profit is related to the capability of abating carbon emissions, the information accuracy, and the demand uncertainty.

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Trade credit financing and coordination for an emission-dependent supply chain

Cited by 115 publications

References 34 publications

Joint Emission Reduction Strategy in Green Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation

Joint Emission Reduction Strategy in Green Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation

Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social Learning

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

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