To the question on identification and differentiation of a philosophical zombie

Abstract

This article examines the task of identification and differentiation of a so-called “philosophical zombie” in order to form a set of operational criteria for determining the agency of artificial intelligence systems. This task can be viewed as one of the possible ways towards solution of a “hard problem of consciousness”. Despite the fact that the proposed approach alone does not solve the “hard problem”, it reveals certain aspects of neurophysiology, cybernetics and information theory towards its solution. The relevance of this task results from the more extensive implementation of artificial cognitive agents in human life – the boundary that distinguishes an intelligent creature from an artificial cognitive agent, endows an object with agency. Therefore, the development of more complicated artificial cognitive agents (artificial intelligence systems) would ultimately lead to a contentious debate on the topic. The author attempts to introduce the procedure of identification of a philosophical zombie and its restrictions, as well as explores the idea whether or not the artificial cognitive agents would obtain qualia. The article is valuable of those interested in artificial intelligence in all of its aspects, as well as in the philosophy of consciousness.