Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?

Abstract

Theodicy, the enterprise of searching for greater goods that might plausibly justify God's permission of evil, is often criticized on the grounds that the project has systematically failed to unearth any such goods. But theodicists also face a deeper challenge, one that places under question the very attempt to look for any morally sufficient reasons God might have for creating a world littered with evil. This 'anti-theodical' view argues that theists (and non-theists) ought to reject, primarily for moral reasons, the project of 'justifying the ways of God to men'. Unfortunately, this view has not received the serious attention it deserves, particularly in analytic philosophy of religion. Taking my cues from such antitheodicists as Kenneth Surin, D.Z. Phillips and Dostoyevsky's Ivan Karamazov, I defend several reasons for holding that the way of thinking about God and evil enshrined in theodical discourse can only add to the world's evils, not remove or illuminate them.Keywords Problem of evil . Theodicy . Anti-theodicy . D.Z. Phillips . Dostoevsky No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of the burning children. -Rabbi Greenberg (1989: 315) Apart from a few lonely voices in the wilderness -such as those of Kenneth Surin and D.Z. Phillips -there is little discussion today within analytic philosophy of religion of the meta-theodical question of whether it is legitimate (in some significant sense) to offer a theodicy in response to the problem of evil. The recent SOPHIA (2008) 47:161-191

The Copernican principle, intelligent extraterrestrials, and arguments from evil

“…Any argument from evil whose condition on divine world creation invokes only properties of the aggregate value of the universe -say, that it exceeds a certain threshold (Plantinga (1977), 63; see Monton (2010) No gratuitous evil condition: a world created by a perfect God would not contain evil the permission of which is not necessary for a greater good or the prevention of a worse evil (Rowe (1979); for critique, see, e.g., Hasker (1992);Zagzebski (1996); Trakakis (2008); and the authors defending the remaining three conditions).…”

“…I will argue that these conditions can be used to generate arguments from evil that according to Copernican reasoning are strengthened by evidence for noetism 7 No gratuitous evil condition : a world created by a perfect God would not contain evil the permission of which is not necessary for a greater good or the prevention of a worse evil (Rowe (1979); for critique, see, e.g., Hasker (1992); Zagzebski (1996); Trakakis (2008); and the authors defending the remaining three conditions). Weak patient-centred condition : a perfect God would ensure that every individual lives a life worth living (Draper (2004); Marilyn McCord Adams (1999); Swinburne (1998); Tracy (1992), 310; see Kraay (2013), 238–239; for critique, see, e.g., Cohen (2013), 82). Strong patient-centred condition : a perfect God would ensure that every evil suffered by an individual is part of the best available means for the overall improvement of her life (Stump (1985), 411; Idem (2010), 456; for critique, see, e.g., Hasker (1992); Tracy (1992) ). Threshold condition : worlds created by a perfect God do not contain evils so horrific that no reason could justify their permission (Dostoevsky (1990); Cohen (2013); Rowe (1996), 270).…”

Moral critique and defence of theodicy

“…I have not given a fine-grained account of the great variety of theodicies on offer. The most important distinction in the essay is that of most or least ambitious theodicies, since this refers to the sort of explanation or reasons a theodicy tries to give (see Trakakis (2008), 162f.). Thus Hick and Plantinga are in the same ‘low-ambition’ category, although they disagree in several important ways.…”

O mal e as razões de Deus:o projeto de teodiceia e suas condições de adequação

“…Em resposta a tais esforços, muito tem sido produzido no sentido de avaliar criticamente a adequação dessas teodiceias enquanto respostas ao problema do mal. Enquanto que a maior parte de tais críticas tem se centrado na análise pontual de teodiceias específicas, alguns têm argumentado contra a própria exequibilidade do projeto de teodiceias como um todo (Surin, 1986;Phillips, 2004;Trakakis, 2008).…”