The Year that <scp>I</scp>srael Considered Joining the European Economic Community

Pardo, Sharon

doi:10.1111/jcms.12036

Cited by 28 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The literature also tends to examine the economic relations between Israel and the EEC (Ahiram and Tovias 1995; Rom 1998), and historical studies of this period rarely offer an in-depth analysis of the archival documentation. One exception is Sharon Pardo's illuminating article on Shimon Peres' secret conversations with Jean Monnet (Pardo 2013). However, that article only studies a narrow time frame and does not cover the early stages of the negotiations between the EEC and Israel.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 91%

The EEC Commission and the negotiations for a trade agreement with Israel, 1958–1964

Heimann

2016

Journal of European Integration

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This article examines the role played by the European Commission in negotiations between the European Economic Community and Israel concerning a trade agreement. It demonstrates that the Commission's attitude to such an agreement was far more positive than that of the six member states. The Commission's leadership pushed the Israelis into pursuing an association agreement, and when this was revealed to be impossible, it took a leading role in concluding a more limited trade agreement. The Commission's proposal formed the basis for the final agreement, which took shape in 1964. The article attempts to discern the motives behind the Commission's behaviour; its central claim is that the Commission's leadership viewed negotiations with Israel and the conclusion of an agreement as a means to achieve their ideological and institutional goals.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 91%

The EEC Commission and the negotiations for a trade agreement with Israel, 1958–1964

Heimann

2016

Journal of European Integration

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“…The desire on the part of the member states to carve out a distinct and an independent common stance towards the Middle East can be traced back to the beginnings of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the early 1970s (Bouris 2014;Pardo and Peters 2010;Pardo 2013;Persson 2015). In 1971, the community adopted the secret 'Schuman document', which proposed the establishment of demilitarized zones, an Israeli withdrawal from the OT, and the internationalization of Jerusalem (Pardo and Peters 2012, Doc.…”

Section: Npe and The Israeli-palestinian Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normative Power Europe meets the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Gordon

Pardo

2015

Asia Eur J

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The article examines the European Union's (EU) normative position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to advance three interrelated claims. First, that EU member states subscribe to a unified normative position because the normative sphere is cut off from the economic sphere. Second, that this separation facilitates the uniformity of the normative position but hinders the possibility of asserting some form of conditionality which might encourage the diffusion of Ian Manners' five core norms. Finally, that normative power Europe is a practice of discursive representation deployed not so much to exert influence on the Other, but rather to help consolidate the European Union as a united actor.

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“…While, at times, Israel raised corrective justice arguments concerning the Holocaust, these played only a minor role and were largely dismissed by the other side. 37…”

Section: Negotiations Between Israel and The Eec 1958-1970mentioning

confidence: 99%

The strategic use of normative arguments in international negotiations

Heimann

Herman

2020

International Relations

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This article claims that normative arguments play a greater role in negotiations than existing scholarship implies. While the approaches of communicative and rhetorical action limit the use of arguments to environments that meet certain conditions, in fact normative arguments are widely used and can be found in almost every example of negotiations. This article seeks to explain this phenomenon. Negotiating parties that feel obligated to tackle normative arguments raised by the opposing side – either because of the presence of an audience or to maintain its reputation – have a number of tools at their disposal. Negotiators who are unsuccessful in tackling these arguments will tend to offer a proposal that is more attractive to the other side. Although normative arguments do not generally have a sweeping influence on the outcome of negotiations, they are still likely to play a significant role. The article applies this theoretical framework to the case of the lengthy negotiations between the EEC and Israel, in which the former had no material motivation and desire to cede to Israel’s demands and nevertheless did so.

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The Year that Israel Considered Joining the European Economic Community

Cited by 28 publications

References 12 publications

The EEC Commission and the negotiations for a trade agreement with Israel, 1958–1964

The EEC Commission and the negotiations for a trade agreement with Israel, 1958–1964

Normative Power Europe meets the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The strategic use of normative arguments in international negotiations

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