The Wage Elasticity of Labour Supply: A Synthesis of Empirical Estimates

Evers, Michiel; Mooij, Ruud de; Vuuren, Daniël van

doi:10.1007/s10645-007-9080-z

Cited by 178 publications

(140 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…In addition, we assume that the average income elasticity is -0.05, which corresponds to the employment-weighted average in MIMIC across different demographic groups. 31 The estimates for the uncompensated and income elasticities are in line with the estimates surveyed in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Evers et al (2008), andMeghir andPhillips (2010), and with recent estimates of the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) in the international literature and in the Netherlands, see Saez et al (2012) and Jongen and Stoel (2013).…”

Section: Intensive Elasticitysupporting

confidence: 72%

Redistributive Politics and the Tyranny of the Middle Class

2016

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Netherlands has a unique tradition in which all major Dutch political parties provide CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis with highly detailed proposals for the tax benefit system in every national election. This information allows us to quantitatively measure the redistributive preferences of political parties. For each political party we calculate social welfare weights by income level using the inverse optimal-tax method. We find that all political parties roughly give a higher social welfare weight to the poor than to the rich. Furthermore, left-wing parties attach higher social welfare weights to the poor and lower social welfare weights to the rich than right-wing parties do. However, we also discover two anomalies. First, all political parties give a much higher social welfare weight to middle incomes than to the working and non-working poor. Second, all Dutch political parties attach a slightly negative social welfare weight to the rich by setting top rates beyond the revenue-maximizing 'Laffer' rate. Finally, we detect a strong political status quo, since social welfare weights of all political parties hardly deviate from the welfare weights that are implied by the pre-existing tax-benefit system. We argue that political-economy considerations are key in understanding the political status quo and why middle-income groups are able to lower their tax burdens at the expense of both the low-and high-income groups. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Codes: C630, D630, H210.

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Section: Intensive Elasticitysupporting

confidence: 72%

Redistributive Politics and the Tyranny of the Middle Class

2016

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“…We follow Horvath (2000) estimate of an elasticity of 1 for the US. This is higher than the usual estimates for the elasticity of labour supply (Evers et al 2008). It could be argued that European countries like the Netherlands feature lower elasticities.…”

Section: Parameters Of the Modelcontrasting

confidence: 56%

Will Ageing Lead to a Higher Real Exchange Rate for the Netherlands?

Ewijk

Volkerink

2012

De Economist

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Long term projections for the Netherlands indicate that demand for nontradables-e.g. health care services-will increase relative to supply due to population ageing. If this leads to higher future real exchanges rates this will erode the return of the savings currently made to prepare for ageing. This paper explores the magnitude of potential price effects using a modified version of the two country, four commodity framework developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (Brookings Papers Econ Activity 1: 2005) to explore the exchange rate effects of the balance of payments reversal in the US. When these price effects are substantial this may have serious consequences for policies to enhance national saving in the Netherlands.

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“…point at household composition as the main explanation. 8 The wage effect in Gamma is in line with the empirical evidence, surveyed by Evers et al (2008). Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) conclude in their survey article on early retirement that the wealth effect on labour supply is small relative to the wage effect.…”

Section: General Equilibriumsupporting

confidence: 57%

Ageing and the Conflict of Interest Between Generations

et al. 2011

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The ageing of the population imposes a considerable burden on longterm public finances in most industrialized countries. Generational accounting has been used across the world to assess the generational imbalance associated with current public policies. In this study, we incorporate Dutch generational accounts in an open economy overlapping generations model to assess the sustainability gap in current Dutch public finances. Our central estimate of the gap is 4.5% of gdp, but the paper also shows the sensitivity of this result. We explore a variety of policy reforms to reduce the sustainability gap, thereby presenting the impact on the intergenerational distribution of the net benefit from government.

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The Wage Elasticity of Labour Supply: A Synthesis of Empirical Estimates

Cited by 178 publications

References 45 publications

Redistributive Politics and the Tyranny of the Middle Class

Redistributive Politics and the Tyranny of the Middle Class

Will Ageing Lead to a Higher Real Exchange Rate for the Netherlands?

Ageing and the Conflict of Interest Between Generations

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