The Veto Power of Sub-national Governments in Brazil: Political Institutions and Parliamentary Behaviour in the Post-1988 Period

Abstract

The article analyses the veto power of territorial governments in Brazil, by examining the parliamentary behaviour of state caucuses (bancadas) as well as their institutional veto opportunities when it comes to matters related to sub-national governments' revenues and decision-making authority over their own taxes, policy responsibilities and expenditures. The "imposition of losses" upon territorial governments characterized legislative production during the 1989-2006 period, even though these decisions were intensely negotiated. The article concludes that the decision-making centralization at the central arenas, the absence of additional veto arenas and the ease with which constitutional amendments may be approved characterize decision-making on federal issues in Brazil. Furthermore, state caucuses (bancadas) do not act as collective players, since they vote divided along party lines. These institutional factors limit the veto power of territorial governments in Brazil.Keywords: Federal state; parliamentary behaviour; political parties; veto power; regional questions. *The author thanks Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi for kindly granting access to the Legislative Database of CEBRAP (Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning). Thanks also to Andréa Freitas for her competent research cooperation in organizing the data on roll-call votes. Lastly, she thanks the CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development) for the financial support provided in the form of a Research Grant and of research project aid from the 2003 Notice for Human, Social and Applied Social Sciences. A debate held within CEBRAP and the comments made by this Review's anonymous referees were particularly useful in revising the original text.