The Use and Abuse of Normative Ethics for Moral Machines

Abstract

How do we develop artificial intelligence (AI) systems that adhere to the norms and values of our human practices? Is it a promising idea to develop systems based on the principles of normative frameworks such as consequentialism, deontology, or virtue ethics? According to many researchers in machine ethics – a subfield exploring the prospects of constructing moral machines – the answer is yes. In this paper, I challenge this methodological strategy by exploring the difference between normative ethics – its use and abuse – in human practices and in the context of machines. First, I discuss the purpose of normative theory in human contexts; its main strengths and drawbacks. I then describe several moral resources central to the success of normative ethics in human practices. I argue that machines, currently and in the foreseeable future, lack the resources needed to justify the very use of normative theory. Instead, I propose that machine ethicists should pay closer attention to the multifaceted ways normativity serves and functions in human practices, and how artificial systems can be designed and deployed to foster the moral resources that allow such practices to prosper.

On the Computational Complexity of Ethics: Moral Tractability for Minds and Machines

“…Nevertheless, the presented work should also be helpful in pinpointing the type of complexity that bounded computational agent's face in the realm of ethical decision-making, and the relevant trade-offs between optimality and feasibility it presents. It should therefore be informative for debates on artificial moral agents, as it draws the question of whether artificial moral agents are practically feasible or normatively desirable closer to the de facto dimensions of AI methods; as opposed to centering on the uniquely human capacities that existing AI systems lack (Stenseke, 2023).…”

“…For instance, the Court of Justice of the European Union.59 That is, courts provides the guarantee that a particular application stands up to the principle upon which it was normatively justified. This argument is developed at a greater length inStenseke (2023).…”