2002
DOI: 10.1177/1465116502003003002
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The Two Sides of Euroscepticism

Abstract: This article aims to make a three-fold contribution to the study of Euroscepticism in the wider Europe. First, it presents a two-dimensional conceptualization of party positions on European integration in general, and of Euroscepticism in particular, distinguishing between diffuse and specific support for European integration (i.e. `support for the ideas of European integration' and `support for the EU'). Second, it analyses the location, type, and electoral strength of party-based Euroscepticism in the four c… Show more

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Cited by 387 publications
(61 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
(12 reference statements)
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“…Moreover, Eurosceptism is rooted in the partisan ideology of far left and far right parties, albeit for different reasons. Radical right parties oppose European integration because it erodes national sovereignty and national identity; the radical left resists further integration in Europe owing to its neo-liberal character (Hooghe et al, 2002;Kopecky and Mudde, 2002).…”
Section: The Role Of Extremist Political Entrepreneurs In the Eu Issumentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, Eurosceptism is rooted in the partisan ideology of far left and far right parties, albeit for different reasons. Radical right parties oppose European integration because it erodes national sovereignty and national identity; the radical left resists further integration in Europe owing to its neo-liberal character (Hooghe et al, 2002;Kopecky and Mudde, 2002).…”
Section: The Role Of Extremist Political Entrepreneurs In the Eu Issumentioning
confidence: 99%
“…He explained that "people"s concerns" about Europe would drive the UK in a struggle for reforming the EU in a way more favourable to the national interest and consistent with the typical mind of the "practical Eurosceptics" (Cameron, 2012) or "Europragmatics" (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002). Cameron connected the British position to the "growing frustration" of other peoples towards the European integration, that he identified both in the popular demonstrations against the austerity policies in Greece, Spain or Italy and in the doubts emerging in the parliaments of the Member States forced to allocate economic resources in favour of the countries involved in the debt crisis (Cameron, 2013).…”
Section: Appeasing Populism: Cameron's Gamblementioning
confidence: 89%
“…Besides, a number of studies have seen the EU impact also manifested in the establishment of new political parties, which are principally informed by the debate on EU matters (Ladrech 2001, 7;Hix and Goetz 2001, 11). The emergence of consensus has also been acknowledged in the candidate countries for EU membership (Baun et al 2006, Sedelmeier 2006, while wide Euroscepticism has also been testified, especially during the EU accession process (Kopecky andMudde 2002, Taggart andSzczerbiak 2004). This change of patterns of party competition has also a profound impact on the party programs: EU integration can offer attractive policy templates (Daniels 1998), strengthen existing policy perspectives, or, modify them (Bomberg 2002).…”
Section: Europeanization: a Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%