The Tripartite Game Model for Electricity Pricing in Consideration of the Power Quality

Abstract

Under the Energy Internet concept the distribution and management of resources in the electricity market have been gradually transiting from a centralized pattern to a decentralized pattern. Correspondingly, the methodological model for the analysis of economic behaviors needs to be upgraded too. Based on the idea of non-cooperative game theory, this paper puts forward a tripartite game model for electricity pricing in consideration of the power quality, which is applicable to the electricity market under the Energy Internet with distributed generation, including the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), generating companies (GENCOs) and the marketers which correspond to the regional power-retailing companies. Then, the sequential quadratic programming based on the quasi-Newton method is given to solve the game model. Finally, four sets of tests with different game factors are carried out to verify the validity and feasibility of the proposed model and algorithm. The SGCC price, the cost and the number of GENCOs and the cross-regional environment are considered in each test, respectively. The results show that this model can adapt well to the various conditions.

Market Trading Model of Urban Energy Internet Based on Tripartite Game Theory

“…The Nash equilibria will only contain the black shaded rectangular region in Figure 6, and the transaction will be realized between the large user and the power grid company. The results can The Nash equilibria of the tripartite game will satisfy the expressions shown in (20) in this scenario, which can be further divided into four intervals. (20) In Figure 6, the boundary line segment between the large user's transaction with the energy supplier and the energy service providers is p ser + p f c = p ug + r p ug η − r p f qj + p hser , namely the line segment A 1 A 2 in Figure 5.…”

“…The Nash equilibria will only contain the black shaded rectangular region in Figure 6, and the transaction will be realized between the large user and the power grid company. The results can also be derived by the first expression in (20).…”

“…A distributed demand-side energy management system was established in [18], and the interaction between users and power sales agents was analyzed through game theory for the future smart grid. As mentioned above, many references [19][20][21][22] regarded electrical energy as the main energy supply of the system and mainly focused on the electricity market trading models, without involving other energy types such as thermal energy [23]. In addition, a trading mode of power generation rights between traditional energy and new energy based on cooperative game theory was discussed in [24], and the profits of market entities and market equilibria are analyzed.…”

Integrated Planning and Operation Dispatching of Source–Grid–Load–Storage in a New Power System: A Coupled Socio–Cyber–Physical Perspective

“…A multi-agent game model considering the quality of electrical energy was proposed from the perspectives of both power generation and consumption in Ref. [139]. This model incentivizes power producers to generate high-quality electricity, facilitating efficient and high-quality bilateral transactions between power companies and users.…”

Investment Strategy and Multi–Objective Optimization Scheme for Premium Power under the Background of the Opening of Electric Retail Side

“…What is more, the traditional electric power company has a large percent of market share, which can bring more market opportunities for the implementation of premium power. Thus, in order to supply premium power to sensitive customers, it is necessary to introduce a possible mechanism, which needs the local government (LG), the traditional electric power company (TEPC), sensitive customers (SCs) and the new electric retail company (NERC) to participate in [35]. With the help of LG, the TEPC takes measures to optimize the network structure and operations on the grid side to guarantee better system indices, site indices and single-event indices of event-based disturbances occurring in the power gird, while SCs and the NERC work together to solve the compatibility problem between sensitive equipment (or processes) and the connecting point (or the connecting system) to guarantee sensitive customers' demands for premium power.…”