The strengths and limits of neoliberal populism: the statism and mass organisation of contemporary rightwing regimes

Tuğal, Cihan

doi:10.1080/13569775.2022.2064645

Cited by 8 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 86 publications

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“…Overall, welfare reforms are an integral part of how these regimes build up and maintain popular support. Here, we concur with Tuğal (2022), who argues that part of the secret of Fidesz’ and AKP’s longevity lies in unconventional economic and social policies. Their core constituencies have differed as Fidesz’s electoral support was initially rooted in the middle class, whereas AKP relied on the poor.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 89%

An illiberal welfare state emerging? Welfare efforts and trajectories under democratic backsliding in Hungary and Turkey

Szikra

Öktem

2022

Journal of European Social Policy

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Mainstream western-centric welfare state research has mostly confined itself to studying social policy in consolidated democracies and tends to assume a synergy between democracy and the welfare state. This article shifts the focus to welfare states in countries with declining democratic institutions and rising right-wing populist rule to explore a complex relationship between (de)democratization and welfare state reforms. We conduct a comparative case study of two extreme cases of democratic decline, Turkey and Hungary. We employ a sequential mixed method approach. First, we assess welfare efforts in the two countries to understand which policy areas were prioritized and whether autocratizing governments retrenched or expanded their welfare states. In the second stage, we explore the trajectory of welfare reforms in Hungary and Turkey, focusing on three analytically distinguishable dimensions of social policy change: policy content, policy procedures (including timing, parliamentary procedures, veto players); and the discourses accompanying reforms. We find that democratic decline facilitates rapid welfare state change but it does not necessarily mean retrenchment. Instead we observe ambivalent processes of welfare state restructuring. Common themes emerging in both countries are the rise of flagship programmes that ensure electoral support, a transition towards top-down decision-making and the salient role of discourse in welfare governance. Overall, similarities are stronger in procedures and discourse than in the direction of reforms. Differences in spending levels and policy content do not suggest that the two cases constitute a coherent illiberal welfare state regime. Instead, we see the emergence of authoritarian features that modify their original welfare models.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 89%

An illiberal welfare state emerging? Welfare efforts and trajectories under democratic backsliding in Hungary and Turkey

Szikra

Öktem

2022

Journal of European Social Policy

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“…If Hungary is one of the extreme cases of authoritarian populism, Turkey can be considered an even more extreme case as it presents a longer period of authoritarian-populist governance under the uninterrupted rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s party from 2002. Like Hungary’s, Turkey’s populist regime sought to undermine checks and balances, enhance institutional regulatory control over the media, whilst using state resources for the empowerment of loyalist business and media groups; all the while, implementing punitive apparatuses against the oppositional forces such as critical media outlets, especially since 2010 (Akca and Bekmen, 2013; Çelik, 2020a; Tuğal, 2022; Yesil, 2016). Taming the opposition was integral to Erdogan’s politics in which he considered all oppositional forces as enemy of the people, famously stating “we are the people, who are you?” In 2018, Erdogan’s party won the majority of votes in a referendum for the constitutional change from multiparty parliamentary democracy into Turkish-style presidential system.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theorizing and mapping media ownership networks in authoritarian-populist contexts: a comparative analysis of Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, and Turkey

Schnyder,

Radl,

Toth

et al. 2023

Media, Culture & Society

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This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing discussions on authoritarian populism and the media, from the lens of the political economy of ownership. In contrast to studies that consider the link between media and authoritarian populism by focusing on the discursive structures of populist communication, this study analyses changes in the structure of news media ownership in four European countries that have been subject to authoritarian populism. By employing social network analysis, a methodology rarely used in media ownership research, we reveal how news media ownership concentration as well as changes in ownership structures have provided favorable conditions for the rise and endurance of authoritarian populism. Our study covers ownership developments during the period 2000 to 2020, in Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, and Turkey where authoritarian populist tendencies have been evident, albeit to varying degrees. Conclusions are drawn to illustrate how authoritarian populist actors in the sample countries not only capitalize on prevailing news media ownership structures, but also proactively intervene in ownership relations in order to increase influence over the diffusion of information.

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“…The RP shared power in a shortlived coalition government, but rather than attempting to implement any part of this program, it served as a prop for the conservative DYP (True Path Party). Nevertheless, a few (mostly symbolic) religious moves by the RP drew the ire of the secularist military, which again intervened in 1997 to ban the party and end the coalition government (Tuğal 2009).…”

Section: Right-wing Traditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Erdoğan had been the city's elected mayor since 1994. Even though he was elected by promising an Islamic city much in line with the Just Order vision, he had quickly shifted to a pro-business line within his first year (Tuğal 2008). The repression of the left and of old-style Islamism, as well as the effectiveness of the new pro-business Islamism in municipal power, paved the way for the election of Erdoğan.…”

Section: Right-wing Traditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…State and state-guided investment in privileged sectors, direct state support to strategic firms, the development of sovereign wealth funds, import substitution measures, and abrogation of central bank independence came to be defining features of the economy. These were used to fight established interests and build more support among diverse strata (Tuğal 2023), deepening the hegemonic nature of Erdoğan's autocracy.…”

Section: Inclusive Neoliberalization the Statist Turn And Their Mass-...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Three Routes to Autocratic Rule: Market Reforms, Politics, and Masculinist Performance in the Making of Right-Wing Regimes

Tuğal¹

2023

Journal of Right-Wing Studies

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How do the economy, right-wing legacies, and personal style shape today’sautocracies? Analysts have commented that especially three contemporary autocrats—Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Narendra Modi, and Rodrigo Duterte—have similar styles, motivations, or bases of support. Yet, this paper will show that the paths that took them to their thrones are quite distinct. Neoliberalization had disorganized society in Turkey, India, and the Philippines. The rule of “strongmen,” in response, showed the way out of this disorganization. The main divergence, however, is that Erdoğanism introduced statism and mass organization as against the disorganizing thrust of neoliberalization. Modi parallels Erdoğan in the civic paramilitary aspects of rule, but not in statism. Other than a weak infrastructure thrust, Duterte did not make the economy into a central issue in the way Erdoğan and Modi did. Moreover, he did not deploy civic activism at all. These three routes have thoroughly shaped and differentiated the autocrats’ styles too, even though all involve a heavy resort to masculinity. Coming from a thick tradition of mass politics and moving in a state-capitalist direction, Erdoğan’s performance incorporates women’s civic mobilization and heavily emphasizes fertility and productivity. Shorn of such anchors and bedeviled by a fragmented polity, Duterte’s rule sexualizes violence rather than production. Modi’s celibate masculinity is similar to Erdoğan’s in its dramatization of size and production but downplays reproduction, except for deepening the ethnic divide his party relies on. These differences have culminated in hegemonic autocracy in Turkey, ethnic autocracy in India, and oligarchic autocracy in the Philippines.

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The strengths and limits of neoliberal populism: the statism and mass organisation of contemporary rightwing regimes

Cited by 8 publications

References 86 publications

An illiberal welfare state emerging? Welfare efforts and trajectories under democratic backsliding in Hungary and Turkey

An illiberal welfare state emerging? Welfare efforts and trajectories under democratic backsliding in Hungary and Turkey

Theorizing and mapping media ownership networks in authoritarian-populist contexts: a comparative analysis of Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, and Turkey

Three Routes to Autocratic Rule: Market Reforms, Politics, and Masculinist Performance in the Making of Right-Wing Regimes

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