The Situational Mental File Account of the False Belief Tasks: A New Solution of the Paradox of False Belief Understanding

Abstract

How can we solve the paradox of false-belief understanding: if infants pass the implicit false belief task (FBT) by nonverbal behavioural responses why do they nonetheless typically fail the explicit FBT till they are 4 years old? Starting with the divide between situational and cognitive accounts of the development of false-belief understanding, we argue that we need to consider both situational and internal cognitive factors together and describe their interaction to adequately explain the development of children's Theory of Mind (ToM) ability. We then argue that a further challenge is raised for existing accounts by helping behaviour versions of the FBT. We argue that the common two-stage accounts are inadequate: we need to allow for three central stages in a continuous development. Furthermore, drawing on Perner et al. 's (Cognition 145: 77-88, 2015) and Perner and Leahy's (Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2): 491-508, 2016) recent mental files account, we provide a new account of the development of these three stages of ToM ability by describing the changes of the structure and organisation of mental files including the systematic triggering role of types of situations. Thereby we aim to establish a situational mental file (SMF) account as a new and adequate solution to the paradox of false-belief understanding.

Rethinking Integration of Epistemic Strategies in Social Understanding: Examining the Central Role of Mindreading in Pluralist Accounts

“…Ruffman & Perner, 2005). While we have elsewhere argued that these tasks provide evidence of an important precursor of mindreading Newen & Wolf (2020), we will not draw on this here and work with the more stringent criterion of mindreading provided by the explicit false belief task. To clarify: mindreading need not result in ascriptions, such as 'Person P believes/desires that X' but it can also be tested by checking for adequate linguistic answers which are sensitive to false or perspectival information of the other.…”

Primitivist theories of truth: Their history and prospects

“…See also Barone et al. (2019), Barone and Gomila (2020), Newen and Wolf (2020), and Phillips and Norby (2019).…”

“… Cp. Spaulding (2020, p. 1).37 On humans, seeBaillargeon et al (2018),Barone et al (2019),Barone and Gomila (2020),Burge (2018),Dudley (2018),Newen and Wolf (2020),Phillips and Norby (2019), Poulin-Dubois et al (2018),Scott and Baillargeon (2017), and the references therein. On non-human animals, seeHorschler et al (2020),Krupenye and Call (2019, § 2.2-2.3), and the references therein.38 For criticism of Burge's interpretation, seeCarruthers (2020) andJacob (2020).…”

Children’s Subjective Understanding of Conative Mental States

“…In related manners, theoretical work has proposed two systems 1 that account for early and late developing forms of theory of mind. The accounts differ in their motivation (e.g., knowledge -belief, implicit -explicit theory of mind, or capacities in other species) as well as in their exact elaboration (e.g., Doherty, 2006;Newen & Wolf, 2020;Perner, 1991;Tomasello, 2018). Yet, they all share the following logic: One early developing system relies on relatively basic notions to explain rational action.…”

“…Newen and Wolf (2020) actually propose a third intermediate system.2 Ancient Greek. : τέλος -'end', 'aim', or 'goal.…”