The Role of Parliaments in the Budget Process

Pelizzo, Riccardo; Stapenhurst, Rick; Olson, David E.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1026346

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 23 publications

(11 reference statements)

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“…In contrast, the U.S. Congress is strong ex ante, with a complex system of specialized committees in both houses to make budgetary decisions with the support of extensive analysis from the Congressional Budget Office. Conversely, the Westminster model is relatively strong ex post, whereas the U.S. Congress conducts less ex post scrutiny, with no public accounts committee or equivalent (Pelizzo, Stapenhurst, and Olson 2006). 4.…”

Section: Next Stepsmentioning

confidence: 99%

PEFA, Public Financial Management, and Good Governance

Mustapha¹,

Long²,

Löffler³

et al. 2019

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Books in this series are published to communicate the results of Bank research, analysis, and operational experience with the least possible delay. The extent of language editing varies from book to book. This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank, all of which are specifically reserved.

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Section: Next Stepsmentioning

confidence: 99%

PEFA, Public Financial Management, and Good Governance

Mustapha¹,

Long²,

Löffler³

et al. 2019

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“…Among presidential systems, scholars view the US federal budget as being jointly determined by presidents and Congress (Canes-Wrone, 2006;Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). By contrast, they claim that in most of Latin America the power of the purse is strongly biased towards the executive, which controls the budget formulation and execution (Hallerberg et al, 2009;Pelizzo, Stapenhurst, & Olson, 2005). Even in this context, Chile is an extreme executive-based model of budget elaboration.…”

Section: Assessing the Executive's Advantage In The Chilean Public Bumentioning

confidence: 99%

Budgetary Negotiations: How the Chilean Congress Overcomes its Constitutional Limitations

Araya¹

2014

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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Recent research suggests that the Chilean Congress is marginalised in the policymaking process, especially when setting the budget. This paper argues that previous studies have overlooked the fact that the legislature uses two amendment tools -specifications and marginal notes -to increase the national budget and reallocate resources within ministries. This behaviour contradicts the constitution, which only allows Congress to reduce the executive's budget bill. To test this empirically, a pooled two-stage time-series cross-sectional analysis is conducted on ministries for the years 1991-2010. The findings clarify how the legislature surpasses its constitutional limits and demonstrate that specifications are useful to predict when Congress increases or decreases a ministry's budget.

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“…Scholars view the U.S. federal budget as being jointly determined by presidents and Congress (e.g., Canes-Wrone 2006; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). In contrast, they claim that in most of Latin America, the power of the purse is strongly biased toward the executive; constitutions and laws tend to delegate the initiative on budget formulation and execution to the government (Hallerberg et al 2009;Pelizzo et al 2005).…”

Section: The Executive's Budgetary "Superpowers": Myth and Realitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Informal Institutions and Horizontal Accountability: Protocols in the Chilean Budgetary Process

Araya

2013

Lat. Am. polit. soc.

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Studies of executive-legislative relations are usually based only on the analysis of formal institutions, although informal institutions also shape interbranch behavior. This omission leads to questionable results when scholars examine the capacity of state institutions to audit other public agencies and branches of government. This article explores how the protocols, an informal institution that shapes the Chilean budgetary negotiations, have increasingly allowed the congress to have a more relevant budgetary role than what the constitution permits. It argues that protocols accommodate some of the undesired consequences of a charter that is strongly biased toward the central government, and describes how this institution has departed from its stringent budgetary focus to encompass broader executive-legislative agreements that enhance the legislature's capacity to oversee the executive.

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The Role of Parliaments in the Budget Process

Cited by 11 publications

References 23 publications

PEFA, Public Financial Management, and Good Governance

PEFA, Public Financial Management, and Good Governance

Budgetary Negotiations: How the Chilean Congress Overcomes its Constitutional Limitations

Informal Institutions and Horizontal Accountability: Protocols in the Chilean Budgetary Process

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