The relation between temperament and rate of temporal discounting

Ostaszewski, Paweł

doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0984(199609)10:3<161::aid-per259>3.0.co;2-r

Cited by 75 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…In two studies that examined differences between groups defined on the basis of personality traits, Ostaszewski (1996Ostaszewski ( , 1997 compared extraverts with introverts and high with low impulsive groups (Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985) as well as high and low sensation seekers (Zuckerman, 1971). In both studies, the extravert and high impulsive groups showed steeper discounting of hypothetical delayed rewards than did the introvert and low impulsive groups.…”

Section: Applications To Group Differencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Discounting Framework for Choice With Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards.

Green¹,

Myerson²

2004

Psychological Bulletin

1,431

1,337

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When choosing between delayed or uncertain outcomes, individuals discount the value of such outcomes on the basis of the expected time to or the likelihood of their occurrence. In an integrative review of the expanding experimental literature on discounting, the authors show that although the same form of hyperbola-like function describes discounting of both delayed and probabilistic outcomes, a variety of recent findings are inconsistent with a single-process account. The authors also review studies that compare discounting in different populations and discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. The present effort illustrates the value of studying choice involving both delayed and probabilistic outcomes within a general discounting framework that uses similar experimental procedures and a common analytical approach.Choice is relatively predictable when the alternatives differ on only one dimension. For example, if individuals are offered a choice between two rewards that differ only in amount, they generally choose the larger rather than the smaller reward. Similarly, if offered a choice between two rewards that differ only in delay, individuals tend to choose the reward available sooner rather than the one available later, and if offered a choice between two alternatives that differ only in probability, they tend to choose the more certain reward. These same general principles, and a complementary set of principles for negative outcomes (e.g., smaller punishments will be chosen over larger ones), apply both to humans and other animals. These behavioral tendencies obviously make both economic and evolutionary sense.Problems arise, however, when choice options differ on more than one dimension-for example, when an individual must choose between a smaller reward available sooner and a larger reward available later. It is also unclear, in general, which alternative an individual would (or should) select when choosing between a smaller, more certain reward and a larger, less certain one or between a less certain reward available sooner and a more certain, but more delayed, reward. These problems are only compounded when rewards differ on all three dimensions (i.e., amount, delay, and probability). The central issue is how individuals make trade-offs among their preferences on these dimensions (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993).This issue is not only of theoretical interest; it also has implications for everyday decision making, which often involves outcomes that differ on multiple dimensions. Examples of such decisions include deciding whether to purchase a less expensive item that can be enjoyed now or to save for a more expensive one; whether to choose a risky investment that potentially could pay off at a high rate or one that pays a low but guaranteed rate of return; and whether to buy

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Section: Applications To Group Differencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Discounting Framework for Choice With Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards.

Green¹,

Myerson²

2004

Psychological Bulletin

1,431

1,337

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…But what if the choice is between a smaller immediate payoff and a larger delayed payoff? Aversion toward waiting (discounting strength) varies among decision makers and may be dependent on individual characteristics, such as age (Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999), impulsivity (Alessi & Petry, 2003), and extraversion (Ostaszewski, 1996).…”

Section: Perceptions Of Immediate Vs Delayed Payoffsmentioning

confidence: 99%

You Only Live Once: Present-hedonistic time perspective predicts risk propensity

Jochemczyk

Pietrzak

Buczkowski

et al. 2017

Personality and Individual Differences

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“…Thus, motor timing, time estimation and temporal foresight processes have been shown to be impaired in impulsive personalities ( Van den Broek et al 1992;Ostaszewski 1996;Reynolds & Schiffbauer 2004) and in adult impulsiveness disorders such as substance abuse (Reynolds 2006;Wittmann et al 2007a,b), borderline personality disorder (Bazanis et al 2002;Berlin et al 2005) and mania (Bschor et al 2004;Christodouiou et al 2006). They are also impaired in patients with fronto-striatal brain lesions and secondary impulsiveness (Rubia et al 1997;Bechara & Van der Linden 2005).…”

Section: Deficits In Timing Functions In Impulsiveness and Attention-mentioning

confidence: 99%

Impulsiveness as a timing disturbance: neurocognitive abnormalities in attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder during temporal processes and normalization with methylphenidate

Rubia

Halari

Christakou

et al. 2009

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

276

282

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We argue that impulsiveness is characterized by compromised timing functions such as premature motor timing, decreased tolerance to delays, poor temporal foresight and steeper temporal discounting. A model illustration for the association between impulsiveness and timing deficits is the impulsiveness disorder of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Children with ADHD have deficits in timing processes of several temporal domains and the neural substrates of these compromised timing functions are strikingly similar to the neuropathology of ADHD. We review our published and present novel functional magnetic resonance imaging data to demonstrate that ADHD children show dysfunctions in key timing regions of prefrontal, cingulate, striatal and cerebellar location during temporal processes of several time domains including time discrimination of milliseconds, motor timing to seconds and temporal discounting of longer time intervals. Given that impulsiveness, timing abnormalities and more specifically ADHD have been related to dopamine dysregulation, we tested for and demonstrated a normalization effect of all brain dysfunctions in ADHD children during time discrimination with the dopamine agonist and treatment of choice, methylphenidate. This review together with the new empirical findings demonstrates that neurocognitive dysfunctions in temporal processes are crucial to the impulsiveness disorder of ADHD and provides first evidence for normalization with a dopamine reuptake inhibitor.

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The relation between temperament and rate of temporal discounting

Abstract: The present study examines the relationship between several temperamental traits (sensation seeking, extraversion-introversion, and impulsivity)

Cited by 75 publications

References 41 publications

A Discounting Framework for Choice With Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards.

A Discounting Framework for Choice With Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards.

You Only Live Once: Present-hedonistic time perspective predicts risk propensity

Impulsiveness as a timing disturbance: neurocognitive abnormalities in attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder during temporal processes and normalization with methylphenidate

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