The psychology of coordination and common knowledge.

Abstract

Research on human cooperation has concentrated on the puzzle of altruism, in which one actor incurs a cost to benefit another, and the psychology of reciprocity, which evolved to solve this problem. We examine the complementary puzzle of mutualism, in which actors can benefit each other simultaneously, and the psychology of coordination, which ensures such benefits.Coordination is facilitated by common knowledge-the recursive belief state in which A knows X, B knows X, A knows that B knows X, B knows that A knows X, ad infinitum. We test whether people are sensitive to common knowledge when deciding whether to engage in risky coordination. Participants decided between working alone for a certain profit and working together for a potentially higher profit that they would receive only if their partner made the same choice. Results showed that more participants attempted risky coordination when they and their prospective partner had common knowledge of the payoffs (broadcasted over a loudspeaker) than when they had only shared knowledge (conveyed to both by a messenger) or primary knowledge (revealed to each partner separately). These results confirm the hypothesis that people represent common knowledge as a distinct cognitive category that licenses them to coordinate with others for mutual gain. We discuss how this hypothesis can provide a unified explanation for diverse phenomena in human social life, including recursive mentalizing, performative speech acts, public assemblies and protests, and self-conscious emotional expressions.

Shame closely tracks the threat of devaluation by others, even across cultures

“…Shame is known to mobilize withdrawal (32,34), which protects the shamed individual against acts immediately motivated by devaluation, and may weaken the formation of common knowledge of the shameful act (66). Submission (33), appeasement (35), and cooperation (37), each would function to increase the value of the shamed individual after devaluation.…”

Cross-cultural regularities in the cognitive architecture of pride

“…The pride display appears to generate common knowledge of enhanced value (52), is produced even by congenitally blind individuals (38), and is recognizable by young children (53) and by adults within and across cultures (45,54). Cultural differences in pride exist (41,(55)(56)(57).…”

Team reasoning: Solving the puzzle of coordination

“…1 Like any other game, the Stag Hunt game models a potentially unlimited range of social interactions (for a completely different scenario involving a butcher and a baker deciding whether to coordinate their actions and sell hot dogs, see Thomas et al, 2014). Some authorities, including Skyrms (2004), view the Stag Hunt game as the fundamental model of the evolution of social life.…”

“…To save his comrades, Spartacus (played by Kirk Douglas) rises to his feet and declares: BI am Spartacus.^Immediately and without any discussion among themselves, the other slaves stand up one by one, also claiming BI am Spartacus,^thereby preventing the Roman general from singling out their leader or anyone else for special punishment. This is a dramatic example of coordination, one of the most fundamental processes of social interaction, manifested whenever two or more individuals try to align their actions with one another in order to achieve a common goal.Coordination is an elementary form of cooperation, relatively neglected by researchers, perhaps partly because it is so familiar and commonplace, but it is beginning to attract attention (e.g., Thomas, Scioli, Haque, & Pinker, 2014). Surprisingly, because it seems so simple and obvious, it turns out to be inexplicable by orthodox game theory, a highly developed theory designed precisely to explain interactive decision making.…”

“…Coordination is an elementary form of cooperation, relatively neglected by researchers, perhaps partly because it is so familiar and commonplace, but it is beginning to attract attention (e.g., Thomas, Scioli, Haque, & Pinker, 2014). Surprisingly, because it seems so simple and obvious, it turns out to be inexplicable by orthodox game theory, a highly developed theory designed precisely to explain interactive decision making.…”