2001
DOI: 10.1177/1354068801007003002
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The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy

Abstract: Candidate selection is vital to political parties but it also poses a dilemma, which is particularly acute in the cartel party, stemming from the position of MPs as both the base of the party in public office and the delegates of the party on the ground. One response is for leaders to democratize candidate selection in form, while centralizing control in practice. An inclusive but unorganized selectorate may give the appearance of democracy without the substance.

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Cited by 246 publications
(196 citation statements)
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“…The impact and effectiveness of such consultations remain to be demonstrated and members themselves are often cautious. Indeed, despite claims that inclusivity would increase democracy, there is evidence that neither widening of the selectorate, nor ballots or consultations, have contributed to a decentralisation of power (Katz, 2001;LeDuc, 2001;Pennings and Hazan, 2001;Kaufmann et al, 2003;Kenny, 2009). Observers expected that participation would decline over time as party members realised that reforms have left their individual influence more or less unchanged (Hopkin,p.…”
Section: Democracy and Participation As Incentivesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The impact and effectiveness of such consultations remain to be demonstrated and members themselves are often cautious. Indeed, despite claims that inclusivity would increase democracy, there is evidence that neither widening of the selectorate, nor ballots or consultations, have contributed to a decentralisation of power (Katz, 2001;LeDuc, 2001;Pennings and Hazan, 2001;Kaufmann et al, 2003;Kenny, 2009). Observers expected that participation would decline over time as party members realised that reforms have left their individual influence more or less unchanged (Hopkin,p.…”
Section: Democracy and Participation As Incentivesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Slíkt samstarf krefst hins vegar stöðugleika í innbyrðis samskiptum flokkanna og að þeir séu reiðubúnir til að gera mála -miðlanir, oft í ríkari maeli en hinir virku meðal stuðningsmanna þeirra myndu kjósa. Hagsmunir flokksforystunnar gaetu því verið að draga úr áhrifum hinna virku, sérstaklega þeirra sem eru líklegir til að gagnrýna forystuna, en útvíkka áhang endahópinn um leið til að draga tennurnar úr hinum virku (Katz 2001). Slíkt fjölgar hinum flokkshollu innan flokkanna en veikir stöðu gagnrýnisradda.…”
Section: Framboðshliðinunclassified
“…Minni áhrif meðlima getur líka verið leið til að draga úr opinskáum deilum milli ólíkra sjónarmiða í flokknum, mismunandi hagsmuna eða landsvaeða. Ein leið til að draga úr áhrifum meðlima, eins og Katz (2001) bendir á, getur verið að fjölga þeim, þannig að "áhangendum" fjölgi hlutfallslega en vaegi virkra meðlima minnki.…”
Section: Stjórnmál Og Stjórnsýsla Veftímarit (Fraeðigreinar)unclassified
“…As a consequence, the electorate must vote for one of several candidates who have been carefully selected by a political party before being allowed to fight an election. In fact recruiting individuals to legislative office is recognized as a core function of political systems, with the quality of candidates selected ultimately affecting the quality of government (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988;Katz, 2001). …”
Section: Persuaded Members Of the Italian Parliament And Italianmentioning
confidence: 99%