The Political Influence of Return: From Diaspora to Libyan Transit Returnees

Abstract

In December 2016, Gambian dictator Jammeh was surprisingly ousted through the ballot box by a democratically motivated opposition. With this remarkable change, tables also turned for Gambian migrants. Gambians abroad were called upon to return and help rebuild the nation, while political interests in host states increased to return “irregular” migrants. In what ways can migrant return be politically influential, especially after a critical juncture as in the Gambia? Current studies fail to consider different types of returnees, including those perceived as highly skilled compared to those seen as low‐skilled. We found that in post‐dictatorial Gambia, both types of returnees have political influence on the new regime. Highly skilled diaspora returnees were explicitly invited as contributors to political developments in the country and thus have a direct political influence. In contrast, low‐skilled returned migrants from Libya are considered as receivers of public goods; yet through claims to political representation they managed to carve out political influence, albeit indirectly.

Backway or bust: causes and consequences of Gambian irregular migration

“…The Gambia under former dictator President Jammeh (1996–2017) was corrupt and the country moved towards economic despair. The democratically elected Barrow government now has a country that is bankrupt, with soaring unemployment and dysfunctional labour markets, that it will have to move forward (Zanker & Altrogge 2017: 2). The new government has spoken positively and optimistically about the change in government leading to changes in migration: ‘the change in context from a dictatorship to a democracy will encourage people to remain and pursue their interest’ (Isatou Touray, Gambian Minister of Trade, Regional Integration and Employment, as cited in Dempha et al .…”

“…There has been a long history and complex ‘culture’ and tradition of regional migration in West Africa, which spans close to 20 centuries (Kebbeh 2013: 1; Willems 2014: 320; Zanker & Altrogge 2017: 3), largely due to its geographic location, drawing international trade and the movement of people throughout history. Intercontinental migration, however, was relatively new to the mid-latter part of the 20th century, beginning as a privilege that only the minority of the population could embark upon.…”

“…Intercontinental migration, however, was relatively new to the mid-latter part of the 20th century, beginning as a privilege that only the minority of the population could embark upon. It now has become one of the most success-promising strategies in the country (Kebbeh 2013; Zanker & Altrogge 2017: 3). In the 1990s through early 2000s, Gambians most often chose to reach Europe via a sea route to the Canary Islands.…”

“…The most common route since the mid-2000s has been the backway from Gambia through Senegal, Mali and Niger into Algeria or mostly Libya. From Libya, the journey continues on to Italy and the rest of Europe (Embiricos 2016; Zanker & Altrogge 2017: 4).…”

“…‘Some observers have argued that the recent intensified suffering along transnational migration routes that cross the globe constitutes the worst migration crisis since the end of WWII’ (Mainwaring & Brigden 2016: 243). Given the alarming background in relation to the backway, there has been relatively little research on the Gambian clandestine migration – exceptions include Uggla (2015), who focused only on those who made unsuccessful attempts and Zanker & Altrogge (2017). There has been more written about Senegalese migrants (Andersson 2014; Mbaye 2014), but although The Gambia and Senegal do have shared histories and cultures, their migrant stories are unique.…”