The paradox of group mind: “People in a group” have more mind than “a group of people”.

Abstract

Three studies examine how subtle shifts in framing can alter the mind perception of groups. Study 1 finds that people generally perceive groups to have less mind than individuals. However, Study 2 demonstrates that changing the framing of a group from "a group of people" to "people in a group," substantially increases mind perception-leading to comparable levels of mind between groups and individuals. Study 3 reveals that this change in framing influences people's sympathy for groups, an effect mediated by mind perception. We conclude that minor linguistic shifts can have big effects on how groups are perceived-with implications for mind perception and sympathy for mass suffering. (PsycINFO Database Record

Facing humanness: Facial width-to-height ratio predicts ascriptions of humanity.

“…The materials and procedure for the current study were identical to Study 1a except as noted. After seeing each face, participants responded to 8 items adapted from Gray and colleagues' (2007) items were selected because they were the four that loaded most strongly onto the agency and experience factors in the original work (Gray et al, 2007; see also Cooley, Payne, Cipolli, & Gray, 2017). In our data, agency and experience were positively correlated, r(45) = .41, p = .005.…”

Facing humanness: Facial width-to-height ratio predicts ascriptions of humanity

“…After seeing each face, participants responded to 8 items adapted from Gray and colleagues' (2007) ; α = .97). These items were selected because they were the four that loaded most strongly onto the agency and experience factors in the original work (Gray et al, 2007; see also Cooley, Payne, Cipolli, & Gray, 2017). In our data, agency and experience were positively correlated, r(45) = .41, p = .005.…”

Strategic consequences of being unsympathetic: For‐profit companies benefit more than individuals from focusing on responsibility

“…However, recent research has suggested that for‐profit companies may suffer from a selective disadvantage in eliciting sympathy as victims (Cooley et al, ; Rai & Diermeier, ). According to these streams of research, to feel sympathy for an actor, or to attribute blame to them, people must perceive the actor as having a mind (H. M. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, ; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, ).…”

“…However, the kind of mind consumers ascribe to organizations differs from that which they ascribe to other human beings. In particular, while consumers are willing to ascribe agentic mental states to for‐profit companies, they tend not to ascribe experiential mental states to them (Cooley et al, ; Knobe & Prinz, ; Rai & Diermeier, ). This distinction is critical for moral judgment because whereas agentic mental states are necessary for eliciting anger following transgression, experiential mental states are necessary for eliciting sympathy following victimization (K. Gray & Wegner, ).…”