2015
DOI: 10.3167/nc.2015.100204
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Abstract: This article inquires into how contemporary populist radical right parties relate to environmental issues of countryside and climate protection, by analyzing relevant discourses of the British National Party (BNP) and the Danish People's Party (DPP). It does so by looking at party materials along three dimensions: the aesthetic, the symbolic, and the material. The article discusses to what extent the parties' political stances on environmental issues are conditioned by deeper structures of nationalist ideology… Show more

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Cited by 86 publications
(43 citation statements)
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“…There is also evidence that nationalist values matter. For example, Forchtner and Kølvraa (2015) show that British and Danish RWP parties symbolically frame the climate agenda as a threat to national sovereignty. Gemenis et al (2012) also find the common use of nationalism and hostility to the EU as frames for treatment of climate change amongst the 13 RWP parties in Europe that they surveyed.…”
Section: Stubager 2008)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is also evidence that nationalist values matter. For example, Forchtner and Kølvraa (2015) show that British and Danish RWP parties symbolically frame the climate agenda as a threat to national sovereignty. Gemenis et al (2012) also find the common use of nationalism and hostility to the EU as frames for treatment of climate change amongst the 13 RWP parties in Europe that they surveyed.…”
Section: Stubager 2008)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moving from such overviews to detailed analyses of arguments, Forchtner and Kølvraa () investigated manifestos and other party materials of the British National Party and the Danish People's Party. Combining quantitative and qualitative elements, their analysis confirmed these parties' climate‐change skepticism (for further confirmation, see Turner‐Graham, in press, whose investigation covered, among others, the British National Party, and Widfeldt & Brandenburg, , p. 578 who noted in passing that the British National Party wants to repeal the Climate Change Act).…”
Section: What We Knowmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Combining quantitative and qualitative elements, their analysis confirmed these parties' climate‐change skepticism (for further confirmation, see Turner‐Graham, in press, whose investigation covered, among others, the British National Party, and Widfeldt & Brandenburg, , p. 578 who noted in passing that the British National Party wants to repeal the Climate Change Act). Forchtner and Kølvraa () argued that the climate, due to its abstract nature, is not easily aesthetically comprehensible and affirmed (in comparison to the countryside), although climate change is highly relevant for the drawing of symbolic boundaries ( us vs. them ) and made meaningful in the context of the nation's self‐sufficiency. Indeed, concerns are continuously voiced over national sovereignty and independence as being threatened by global climate‐change policies.…”
Section: What We Knowmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Whilst these political and environmental crises have been analyzed extensively on their own, this article contributes to the analysis of their intersection, enquiring into communication about global climate change by particularistic far-right actors. Indeed, research on climate change has addressed the role of the liberal-left and conservative ideology (identifying conservative stances as rather skeptical), but the far right's views on climate change have not been scrutinized to a similar extent (but see Forchtner & Kølvraa, 2015;Gemenis et al, 2012;Lockwood, 2018;Voss, 2014). This is despite the fact that both the re-emergence of these actors, ranging from anti-liberal democracy radical-right populists to extreme-right actors and antidemocratic neo-Nazis/fascists, and climate change are products of the rise of a world risk society (Beck, 1998): while climate change is a paradigmatic, unintended consequence of previous modernization, the contemporary success of the far right is, at least partly, a result of moving from first to second modernity, with its increased levels of uncertainty and the destabilization of identities.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Instead of investigating parties (Forchtner & Kølvraa, 2015;Gemenis et al, 2012;Voss, 2014), we focus on non-party actors which, in contrast to so-called far-right 'populist' parties acting more or less in the mainstream of their respective public spheres, can articulate their ideology in a fairly unconstrained manner. We do so by looking at a corpus compiled from German magazines and a blog (2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014), a sample which includes sources characterized by varying degrees of ideological rigor.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%