The myths of Brexit

Cromby, John

doi:10.1002/casp.2377

Cited by 10 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…As Nerlich (2017) notes, claims about the NHS 'reinforced, exploited and entrenched various "myths" about the EU and about what it means to leave the EU'. And as Cromby (2019) observes, the NHS Brexit bus campaign worked by promoting a sense of 'mythical thinking about Brexit' and 'by organising feelings of loyalty, affection, or gratitude toward the NHS, and conversely feelings of anxiety about its current state, in support of the "leave" position'.…”

Section: The Brexit Bus Campaignmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Brexit Religion and the Holy Grail of the NHS

Kettell¹,

Kerr²

2021

Social Policy and Society

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The role of populism in mobilising support for Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union has been well noted. But a key feature of populist politics – the use of religious discourses – has been largely overlooked. This article addresses this gap by exploring the way in which the Leave campaign framed Brexit in quasi-religious and mythological terms. Three core themes are identified: (1) that the British ‘people’ had a unique role to play in global affairs; (2) that the sanctity of this special status was threatened by elites and migrants; (3) that the referendum gave voice to the sacred ‘will of the people’. These narratives were underpinned by a strategic discourse centring on claims that EU membership was exacerbating a crisis in health and social care. This myth was encapsulated by the so-called ‘Brexit bus’ campaign.

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Section: The Brexit Bus Campaignmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Brexit Religion and the Holy Grail of the NHS

Kettell¹,

Kerr²

2021

Social Policy and Society

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“…The affective practices focus on everyday forms of sedimentation shows potential to flesh out Cromby's (2019) Vygotskyan account of Brexit in terms of condensed and internalized dialogical emotions as well as the repetition of feelings of organisation over time that eventually "come to include feelings of knowing that leaving the EU is desirable" (Cromby, 2019, p. 65). The analysis avoided pathologising people who supported leaving the EU and any emphasis on "the gullibility of ordinary people as well as their xenophobia" (Walkerdine, 2020, p. 144).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Presenting an emotion-focused analysis of the EU referendum, Cromby (2019) has argued that explanations of Brexit have largely been framed in terms of the "feeling-organising myth" in which Brexit represents the anger and apathy of those left behind in Britain by market forces and globalisation (McKenzie, 2017a(McKenzie, , 2017b. On this account, feelings of "anger, resentment, discontent, and hope, of feeling left behind or left out" (Cromby, 2019, p. 59) reflected the reality of growing inequality in the UK and contributed to a concomitant irrational diversion of "feelings of resentment from powerful elites" (Cromby, 2019, p. 59) towards immigrants.…”

Section: Emotion-focused Explanations Of Reactionary 'Anti-preferences' and Populist Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Reactionism as Affective Practice: UKIP Supporters and Non-Voters in Pre-Brexit England

Sullivan

2021

PaG

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United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) supporters and non-voters in England participate respectively in forms of engaged and disengaged anti-political activity, but the role of individual, group-based, and collective emotions is still unclear. Drawing upon recent analyses of the complex emotional dynamics (e.g., <em>ressentiment</em>) underpinning the growth of right-wing populist political movements and support for parties such as UKIP, this analysis explores the affective features of reactionary political stances. The framework of affective practices is used to show how resentful affects are created, facilitated, and transformed in sharing or suppressing populist political views and practices; that is, populism is evident not only in the prevalence and influence of illiberal and anti-elite discourses but also should be explored as it is embodied and enacted in “past focused” and “change resistant” everyday actions and in relation to opportunities that “sediment” affect-laden political positions and identities. Reflexive thematic analysis of data from qualitative interviews with UKIP voters and non-voters (who both supported leaving the EU) in 2015 after the UK election but before the EU referendum vote showed that many participants: 1) shared “condensed” complaints about politics and enacted resentment towards politicians who did not listen to them, 2) oriented towards shameful and purportedly shameless racism about migrants, and 3) appeared to struggle with shame and humiliation attributed to the EU in a complex combination of transvaluation of the UK and freedom of movement, a nostalgic need for restoration of national pride, and endorsement of leaving the EU as a form of “change backwards.”

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“…Rather, he benefited from the pandemic to frame China as the new enemy of 'the West' renewing the relevance of his Brexit Party in current affairs. As for PM Boris Johnson, aside from benefitting from the pronounced populist undertones of the pro-Brexit campaign, and from decades of right-wing, pro-Brexit mainstream media (Cromby, 2019), any populist elements inside his discourse surrounding the pandemic were considerably toned down, arguably even non-existent. The mainstream media was also careful to avoid a populist tone in criticising the prime minister.…”

Section: The Politicization Of Covid-19 Issue By Populistsmentioning

confidence: 99%